these orifices should burst or become obstructed, it would not be possible to
exist and stand reverently before God.”
While dealing predominantly with legal questions pertaining to religious
and civil matters, talmudic discourse periodically addressed philosophical
questions, sometimes explicitly and sometimes implicitly. At times, a mun-
dane legal discussion took a philosophical and speculative turn. For example,
in defining the obligation to return a lost article to its owner, the Mishneh
had explicated the biblical injunction by defining two types of lost articles
that had to be returned: a clearly marked article, and an article of great
value. The Gemara inferred that the overarching principle that determines
when one has to return a lost article is yeush(despair). That is, if the finder
can reasonably assume that the person who lost the article has despaired of
ever recovering it, the finder can keep the lost article. If the lost article is
something the owner will try to retrieve, the article must be returned.
At this point, two Amoraic scholars, Rava and Abaye, push the discussion
a step further by positing the case of the lost article whose owner is not yet
aware that the article has been lost. If the article is clearly the type that the
owner will despair of finding, but no such despair has taken hold in the
owner’s mind because the owner is unaware of its loss can the finder then keep
the article? The larger, philosophical question, in a way anticipating (Bishop)
George Berkeley by more than a thousand years, asks whether “lostness” is an
innate quality that is defined only by human perception.
Other philosophical musings are more explicit, such as the extent of rab-
binic authority with respect to divine authority. In a celebrated case, a group
of scholars disagree as to whether the oven of a certain Achnai can be made
kosher. During the ensuing debate, Rabbi Jeremiah takes a position contrary
to everyone else. After having numerous exegetical proofs rebuffed, Rabbi
Jeremiah invokes a series of supernatural proofs: “If the law is as I say, let
that carob tree walk four hundred cubits ... let the current in that stream
change direction ... let the walls of this house of study collapse upon us.” In
each case, this supernatural proof is rejected. “We do not accept proof from
walking trees ... water changing direction ... walls of a house of study.” At
this point, Rabbi Jeremiah says dramatically, “If the law is as I say, let the
proof come from heaven.” Yet when a heavenly voice affirms the position of
Rabbi Jeremiah, the other scholars reject this proof, too, saying that God has
given the rabbis the ability and the right to interpret laws and make legal
decisions – a remarkable delineation between the ontological realms of
heaven and earth in legal matters.
In addition, talmudic discourse betrays a discernible social and political
agenda. The former is perhaps most evident with respect to the status of
women. Taking a hierarchical view of Jewish society, the rabbis often rele-
gated women to a second-class status. This has prompted recent scholars to
debate the status and image of women in talmudic discourse. Some scholars,
58 The rise of Rabbinic Judaism