the defendant’s transmitter had one particular setting that served only one function – to operate
the Chamberlain rolling code GDO. The fact that the transmitter was able to serve more than
one purpose was insufficient to deny summary judgment to Chamberlain.^1230
Next, the defendant argued that Chamberlain’s computer programs were not in fact
subject to copyright protection. The court ruled that this argument raised a disputed issue of
material fact sufficient to deny summary judgment, particularly since Chamberlain had not
supplied to the defendant the most recent version of the rolling code software until filing its reply
brief (which differed from the version of the software that Chamberlain had registered), and the
defendant had therefore not had a sufficient opportunity to review it.^1231
Finally, the defendant argued that the consumers’ use of the defendant’s transmitter with
Chamberlain’s rolling code GDOs was authorized. In particular, Chamberlain argued that a
consumer who purchases a Chamberlain GDO owns it and has a right to use it to access his or
her own garage. Before the defendant’s transmitter was capable of operating the rolling code
GDO, the consumer was required to program the transmitter into the GDO. The defendant
argued that this fact demonstrated that the consumer had thereby authorized the use of the
defendant’s transmitter with the GDO software. The defendant further noted that the packaging
for Chamberlain’s GDO did not include any restrictions on the consumer’s ability to buy a
replacement transmitter or additional transmitter.^1232 Thus, according to the defendant, “those
Chamberlain GDO consumers who purchase a Skylink transmitter are not accessing the GDO
without the authority of Chamberlain, but instead, have the tacit permission of Chamberlain to
purchase any brand of transmitter that will open their GDO.”^1233 The court ruled that these facts,
together with the fact that there was a history in the GDO industry of universal transmitters being
marketed and sold to allow homeowners an alternative means to access any brand of GDO,
raised sufficient disputes of material fact about whether the owner of a Chamberlain rolling code
GDO was authorized to use the defendant’s universal transmitter to deny summary judgment to
Chamberlain.^1234
Following this opinion, and at the invitation of the court, the defendant moved for
summary judgment on Chamberlain’s DMCA claim, which the court granted.^1235 Although both
(^1230) Id. at 1037-38.
(^1231) Id. at 1038.
(^1232) Id. at 1039.
(^1233) Id.
(^1234) Id. at 1040. An amicus brief submitted by the Computer and Communications Industry Association (CCIA)
argued that the court should deny summary judgment because the defendant’s activities fell within Section
1201(f) of the DMCA, which CCIA argued permits circumvention of a protective measure for the purpose of
achieving interoperability. The court noted that, although it was not reaching this issue, the defendant might
perhaps be entitled to summary judgment on that basis. Id.
(^1235) Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Technologies, Inc., 292 F. Supp. 2d 1040 (N.D. Ill. 2003). As a
preliminary matter, Chamberlain asserted that the defendant bore the burden of proof to show that it was
authorized to circumvent – not access – Chamberlain’s software as an affirmative defense. The court disagreed,
ruling that it was clearly Chamberlain’s burden to demonstrate that the defendant circumvented a technological
measure without the authority of the copyright owner. Id. at 1044.