THE SICK MAN OF EUROPE 139rights, were more likely to create the wealth and knowledge that fueled
the Renaissance and further cultural and scientific advancement.
Many more theories are possible, and all of the above may be discussed
or dismissed as quickly as one chooses. From the view of military history,
one tends to look at factors such as armament and leadership as the de-
terminants of history. While these may have their places in deciding the
outcome of great events, it is a well-established truism that armies and
leaders aren’t accidents, but rather the product of the societies that create
them. If this is the case—and a wealth of evidence supports this idea—
then it is probably safe to look at the military defeat of the Turks in these
terms. Certainly the feudal basis of the Ottoman Empire lasted far later
than in other nations. Certainly this use of manpower was increasingly
inefficient, and eventually quite futile. The persistent use of untrained and
undisciplined soldiers caused terrible losses to the populations that pro-
vided the soldiers and great hardship as the unpaid levies took out their
rage on the lands and peoples of the sultan’s enemies.
By contrast, in the West the focus turned away from feudal armies to
professional, standing armies supported and trained by the state. Even the
militias were no longer feudal and were provided with uniform training.
Standing armies allowed training in the profession of arms that kept up
with technological developments that increased firepower—which rapidly
became the real measure of an army’s strength. Standing armies allowed
the development of drill systems that laid out every manner of movement
and maneuver. They also allowed development of professional soldiers
who, by the eighteenth century, were frequently attending military acad-
emies before entering the army. By the mid-nineteenth century army staff
colleges were beginning to appear and the military art was well on its way
to becoming a science.
If this is a correct theory, then it is more an indictment of the imperial
choice to retain a feudal system commanded by officers designated by
birth rather than by training and by the quality and fighting spirit of the
Ottoman soldier. The performance of the Ottoman Turks at Gallipoli and
Kut clearly indicate that well-led Turkish troops could defeat even the
British. The ultimate historical judgment of the old Ottoman Empire must
be that in the end, it bought enough time for the modern Turkish nation
to emerge. This is not a bad epitaph.
CHRONOLOGY
1570s Ottomans campaign in Yemen, Iran, the Caucasus, the Black
Sea, the Mediterranean, and the Balkans.