MULLAHS AND MACHINE GUNS 155
These fights were no more successful than most colonial resistances.
Dutch rule would continue uninterrupted until 1942, when the Japanese
empire would sweep down on the islands. The brief Japanese rule gave
lip service to freeing the islanders, but was, of course, just another wave
of colonial invasion.
The British East India Company had controlled the Indian subcontinent
in greater or lesser part since the middle of the eighteenth century. Fol-
lowing the mutiny of various regiments of the East India Company army
in 1856, the British crown took over the colony. With government control,
British influence moved farther north and west. This spread brought the
imperial power into contact with the various hill tribes of which the Pa-
thans of Afghanistan are the best known. There were several wars, and in
the First Afghan War, 1839 to 1842, Afghan tribesmen annihilated a Brit-
ish army, allowing only one survivor to escape through the Khyber Pass.
This astonishing event was one of the periodic disasters at which the
British excel, and a classic case of how not to use military force for im-
perial ends.
The events of the First Afghan War—at least the first for the British,
certainly not for the Afghans—began in 1837, when the emir of Afghan-
istan, Dost Muhammad, received a Russian officer bearing a note from
the Czar, merely hoping for good relations. This caused some concern to
the British, who feared that the Russian colossus would swoop south
through Persia and Afghanistan and then invade British India. The situa-
tion deteriorated in the minds of the poorly informed British governors in
Calcutta, causing them to install a pretender, Shah Sujah, in Afghanistan
and support him with an army. This force of two small divisions from the
armies of Bengal and Bombay arrived in Kabul on August 6, 1839. The
British had rather hoped that the Afghans would tractably accept the new
shah. They had much to learn about the Afghans.
As it happened, British subsidies kept the mountain chiefs happy
through much of 1841. When in the summer of that year they were with-
drawn, matters became heated. A brigade being withdrawn down the Khy-
ber Pass as an economy measure was attacked in September. In October
the British resident in Kabul and several officers were killed by rioters
when hillmen overran one of the Shah’s outposts. The situation was rap-
idly spiraling out of British control. The British had a small, mediocre
army commanded by Major-General Elphinstone, an aging officer with a
good but antique record. The 12,000 or so combatant soldiers were nearly
submerged in 40,000 camp followers and dependents. The Shah was of
no assistance; his people ignored him and the army had no real political
direction. Nor did old General Elphinstone have much to contribute as the