MULLAHS AND MISSILES 181could not rescue the forces locked in battle with the 40th Brigade. As the
Israeli tanks arrived, the Jordanians engaged and nearly defeated them.
But by then the Jordanian mechanized soldiers had been fighting nonstop
for nearly twenty-four hours. They were short of food, fuel, and ammu-
nition and were utterly exhausted. At this point the Israeli air force inter-
vened, launching a storm of bombs, rockets, and cannon fire on the hapless
Jordanian force. In the subsequent slaughter, the Jordanian 40th Armored
Brigade was utterly destroyed as a fighting force. Had the initial air strikes
not given the Israelis absolute control of the air, the outcome of the battle
would have been different.
The Jordanian front was eventually contained and crushed by the com-
bination of Israeli ground and air attacks. The Jordanian armed forces
were driven back across the Jordan River. By the time the war concluded,
King Hussein had lost half his kingdom and 6,000 soldiers because he
had allowed Jordan to be sucked into the war by the hysteria of the Arab
world and the military agreement he had signed with Egypt ten days before
the war. President Nasser of Egypt had lied to him about the status of
Egyptian forces and caused him to launch his attacks prematurely. The
Syrians and Iraqis had promised him support that never materialized.
The blame for the failure lay with President Nasser and his shortcom-
ings as a military commander. General Moshe Dyan summarized the cause
of Nasser’s failure succinctly when he said that Nasser was blinded by the
apparent strength of masses of Russian-made equipment that he had ac-
cumulated. The Egyptians and other Arab armies had learned to operate
the mountains of sophisticated hardware and electronic equipment, but
they had not learned to employ it in the field with any particular skill.
In addition, Nasser failed to conceptualize a rapid, hard-hitting war of
maneuver in the desert. He viewed the process of war as a long-drawn-
out struggle revolving around fortifications and artillery barrages, almost
in the sense of the trench warfare of World War I. Nasser also failed to
recognize the power of the first strike and abandoned that decisive factor
to the Israelis.
The Egyptian officer corps had failed the Egyptian soldiers badly.
Though there was retribution and punishment after the war, their failure
to stand and fight with their soldiers had cost Egypt the Sinai and the war.
As a contrast, 23 percent of the casualties suffered by the Israeli ground
forces were among its officers and NCOs. They led their troops from the
front and did not cower behind the safety of the Suez Canal.
If the Arab coalition was defeated, it was not discouraged. Eagerly
rearmed by their Soviet allies, the Muslims prepared for a new war. This
time enough Soviet advisers arrived with the mountain of Soviet equip-