MULLAHS AND MISSILES 183utter confusion: along the Lexicon road raced Egyptian ambulances; units
of the Egyptian infantry were rushing around in all directions, as were
Egyptian tanks. The impression was that nobody knew what was happen-
ing or what to do.” This behavior is typical of any army when its command
structure breaks down, and the Israeli attacks demonstrated the relative
ease of producing that chaos and panic in the Egyptian army.
On October 19 an Israeli force attacked an Egyptian-held outpost
known as Orcha. A small infantry force, probably no larger than a battal-
ion, garrisoned it. The Egyptians fought from their trenches and fortifi-
cations with extreme obstinacy, and though the Israelis eventually took
the position, the Egyptians left 300 dead. These Egyptians were no longer
the same troops who, in 1967, had fled when they saw an Israeli soldier.
The war on the Syrian front was different from that in the Sinai. The
Syrians attacked two Israeli brigades with three infantry divisions and two
armored divisions. They had about 1,200 tanks and 1,000 artillery pieces
facing the Israeli forces with 170 tanks and 60 artillery pieces. Though
the terrain was not particularly good for the offense, the Israelis had
proven it could be done in 1967 and would prove it again in this war.
Irrespective of how dogged the Israeli defense, a well-managed force with
a nearly 10:1 superiority should have had no problem overwhelming their
opponent. Yet, the Syrians were incapable of victory.
The Syrian failure had several apparent reasons. First, Syrian command
and control obviously failed. It is probable that they lacked officers of
sufficient authority in the leading ranks directing the battle, so the Syrian
armored forces blundered forward with little coordination or direction,
which allowed the Israelis to pick them off. This is the same problem the
Egyptians had, but it was apparently far worse.
Second, little coordination is apparent between the various combat
arms. Though Syrian artillery ranged over the battleground, the Syrian
artillery spotters seemed incapable of successfully directing fire at moving
targets such as tanks. The Syrian air force also failed to intervene in any
meaningful manner, and once the Syrian antiaircraft missile batteries were
destroyed, the Israeli air force swept the sky clear of Syrian aircraft.
As the Syrian army was pursued toward Damascus, an Iraqi armored
division was moving to their support. The Israelis, seeing the Iraqi division
on their flank, responded quickly and took up positions waiting for its
advance. The Iraqi 3rd Armored Division advanced during the morning
of October 13 directly into an Israeli killing zone and was butchered. The
Iraqis were learning for the first time what it was like to face a well-
trained enemy. In a like manner the reconstituted Jordanian 40th Armored