MULLAHS AND MISSILES 187army launched a terror campaign on March 25 designed to cow the Ben-
galis into submission.
India was not involved until Pakistan attacked Indian airfields in Kash-
mir on December 3, 1971. India responded by attacking both East and
West Pakistan. On December 4, 1971, the Indians launched an overwhelm-
ing three-pronged attack into East Pakistan and in twelve days took 93,000
Pakistani soldiers prisoner. The Pakistani army was torn by racial prob-
lems. Many of the ethnic Bengalis in the East Pakistani Army deserted,
and dissension within the ranks made that army a fragile instrument. The
Indian air force quickly achieved absolute air superiority in the east and
the Indian navy blockaded the East Pakistan ports, effectively isolating
East Pakistan from West. Victorious in the east, India occupied East Pa-
kistan, which declared its independence as Bangladesh, on December 6,
1971.
In the west and in Kashmir the Indians found the Pakistani army un-
dertaking ground operations against them. A large tank battle occurred
when Pakistani armor confronted the Indian 1st Armored Corps in what
became known as the Battle of Chamb. The Indians underemployed their
armor, sending it into battle in a piecemeal fashion. The Pakistani 23rd
Division, under General Eftikhar, concentrated its armor and achieved
substantial success. The combination of concentration of force and leading
from the front was to bring the general much success. Unfortunately his
brigade commanders did not emulate his example, which diluted the suc-
cess of the attack. Sadly, the rest of the supporting Pakistani forces failed
to match the 23rd Division’s performance, and Eftikhar’s success availed
the Pakistanis little. His 23rd Division would suffer 2,216 of the 4,958
casualties suffered by the Pakistani army in the west during the entire war.
Eftikhar was an aggressive, hard-charging general and might fairly be
called the first of the Muslim armored warfare specialists. It is interesting
that the Muslims of Pakistan were capable of mastering mobile warfare
and the great complexity that goes with it.
The Battle of Hilli (November 22 to December 12) was a Pakistani
defensive battle. Brigadier Tajjamal Hussain commanded the brigade
posted in the Hilli sector, leading his troops from the front line. The Pa-
kistani defense was so resolute that they held and fought after the final
armistice of the war was signed. Another Pakistani brigadier had to be
brought forward to surrender his brigade for him on December 18. His
commander, Major General Lachhman Singh, would later write, “Briga-
dier Tajjamal was the only exception in my sector who showed fanatical
will to fight even at the cost of his life.” In sharp contrast, at Dhaka, the