MULLAHS AND MISSILES 191ineffective. The Pasdaran and Basij, being little more than untrained mi-
litia, were generally slaughtered in front of the prepared Iraqi positions.
Huge numbers of casualties resulted.
In 1983 Iran mounted five large-scale offensives, all of which failed
and were repulsed with heavy losses. Iraq intensified air and naval attacks
against Iranian strategic targets, including ports, industrial facilities, tank-
ers, and merchant shipping in general. Targets included the oil wells in
the Nowruz field and the oil terminal at Kharg Island. The Iranian air force
was also rapidly disappearing as the lack of American spare parts began
to bite into its operational capabilities.
In 1984 the war resumed its intensity with the Iraqis standing on the
defensive and launching bombardment attacks on Iranian cities. On Feb-
ruary 15 the largest Iranian offensive to date was launched with 500,000
men involved on both sides and repulsed with 20,000 casualties. Again
the regular Iranian army played little part in this offensive—a mere quarter
of the 250,000 Iranians involved. Stalemate resumed from 1984 to Feb-
ruary 1986. In February 1984 the Iraqis first used poison gas on a large
scale. They are reported to have killed 40,000 Iranians on Majnoon Island
in this attack.
The Iranian offensives continued to be mostly Pasdaran and Basij
troops. On January 28, 1985, the Iraqis launched their first offensive since
- Convinced of their equipment superiority and witnessing the in-
ability of the Iranians to launch a successful offensive, the Iraqis thought
the opportunity ripe. The attack was only a marginal success and failed
in its goal of deterring or frustrating Iranian preparations for their next
offensive, which was launched on March 11, 1985.
This new Iranian assault abandoned frontal human-wave assaults and
returned to conventional military operations. The Iranian government had
successfully worked to turn the Pasdaran into a military force capable of
conventional military operations. The offensive launched in February in-
flicted about 10,000–12,000 casualties on the Iraqis for a loss of 15,000
Iranian casualties. However, it failed to dislodge the enemy from their
positions. The war once again became static, marked by intermittent ar-
tillery barrages and local operations. The focus of operations returned to
a strategic level, with both sides attacking civilian shipping and strategic
targets.
On February 9, 1986, the Iranians launched Operation Dawn VIII and
finally cleared the Iraqis from Iranian territory. The Iranians captured the
Faw Peninsula at the southeastern tip of Iraq and retained it despite re-
peated counter-attacks. Unable to recapture Faw, the Iraqis launched an