MULLAHS AND MISSILES 195Islamic warriors. If they died fighting an infidel, which definitely included
the atheistic Soviets, they would becomeshakhidand go to paradise.
Thus, the combination of blood feud against an infidel and jihad turned
the male population of Afghanistan into most tenacious guerrillas. The
feud imperative obliged revenge and the jihad guaranteed the reward of
paradise if they were killed.
As a result, the war was marked by extreme savagery on both sides. A
discussion with E. Vovsi, a veteran of the Soviet army and of the Afghan
war who served in Afghanistan from October to November 1982, reveals
that the Soviet soldiers had no idea what awaited them when they went
into Afghanistan. Early in the war battalions were rotated in and out after
a few months’ service, so disconcerting was the fighting.
Mujahedin war was something the Afghans understood quite well as
heirs to a rich martial history and continuing experience of banditry and
tribal conflict. The Soviet invasion, however, was an assault by infidels,
by “crusaders” seeking to destroy Islam. It mattered little that the Soviets
were officially atheists; they were no different to the hill men than the
Catholic crusaders that had marched into Palestine 800 years earlier.
To the mujahedin, the war was a holy war. They had little concern for
their personal safety in combat and could stand and fight to the death
rather than run away from the superior Soviet firepower. Vovsi says that
when he encountered Afghan prisoners he saw nothing but hatred in their
eyes. He doubted that they had any concept of the struggle in Kabul to
establish a puppet Afghan regime, subservient to the Soviets. They were
simply filled with anger at the Soviet infidels who had intruded into their
country.
Most of the Afghan attacks were hit-and-run in nature. For obvious
reasons they avoided open confrontations with the militarily superior So-
viet forces. Instead, they would throw grenades in marketplaces, poison
wells, and snipe at Soviet supply convoys. The Afghans had no vehicles
and operated entirely on foot, or on horseback. They were more fit, as a
result, and their greater endurance, coupled with their knowledge of the
countryside, gave them tremendous advantages over the Soviets.
In contrast, the Soviets were frequently overly wedded to their vehicles
and maneuvered on roads or by air. The Afghans were well informed of
Soviet movements and frequently caught these convoys as they moved
about. They also caught and savaged airborne detachments while landing,
before the Soviets could bring up supporting arms.
When cornered, however, they were ready to fight to the death. The
Soviets often remarked that the Afghans did not know the meaning of the
word “retreat.” They had no concern if they died, or if their women and