Notes to pp. 373–376 579of being called human.’ Adorno to Bühler, 23 September 1960 (Br 223/
67).
28 Gottfried Benn, Briefe an F. W. Oelze, 1950–1959, p. 209.
29 Peter Rühmkorf, Die Jahre, die ihr kennt, p. 153.
30 See Clemens Albrecht et al., Die intellektuelle Gründung der Bundes-
republik, pp. 220ff. and 228ff.
31 For example, on Saturday, 26 September, Adorno, introduced by René
König, gave the introductory talk on ‘The Individual and Organization’.
This was followed by discussion with such luminaries as José Ortega y
Gasset (Madrid), Ernst von Schenk (Basel), Franco Lombardi (Rome),
Robert Jungk (Los Angeles) and Alexander Mitscherlich (Heidelberg).
32 Adorno, ‘Zur Bekämpfung des Antisemitismus heute’, GS, vol. 20.1,
p. 360.
33 Adorno, ‘Notes on Philosophical Thinking’, Critical Models, p. 132 (trans-
lation adjusted).
34 Adorno, Minima Moralia, p. 21.
35 Hartmut Paffrath, Die Wendung aufs Subjekt.
36 Adorno, ‘Theory of Pseudo-Culture’, pp. 15–39.
37 Adorno, ‘Zur Demokratisierung der deutschen Universitäten’, GS,
vol. 20.1, pp. 335 and 336f.
38 See Institute of Social Research, Mitteilungen, no. 10, 1999, p. 31ff.
39 Thorsten Bonacker has tried to show that the criticism that Habermas
aimed at Schelling’s attempt to ground identity in the infinity of history
was the starting-point for Habermas’s own contribution to the further
development of critical theory. ‘Against this background of a turning away
from Schelling, but while retaining his approach, the entire future devel-
opment of critical theory can be understood as the attempt to tackle the
unity of the unconditioned and the uncertain, but this time in a post-
metaphysical manner and with quasi-transcendental methods’ (Bonacker,
‘Ungewißheit und Unbedingtheit’, p. 113f.).
40 In his review Habermas had asked: ‘Is it possible for the planned murder
of millions of human beings about which we all now know to be made
comprehensible by explaining it ontologically as an arbitrary blow of fate?
Is it not in fact a crime committed by people who acted while in full
command of their faculties – and is it not at the same time the bad con-
science of an entire nation?... Is it not the primary task of all reflective
people to clarify the actions of a nation that were carried out in full
consciousness, and to ensure that this knowledge is kept alive?’ (Jürgen
Habermas, Philosophisch-Politische Profile, p. 65ff.).
41 Jürgen Habermas, Die neue Unübersichtlichkeit, pp. 167ff. and 214ff. In
this interview of 1981, as well as in two further conversations with the
present writer, Habermas emphasized that, outside Frankfurt in the early
1950s, there was no such thing as an unambiguous position called ‘critical
theory’: ‘To my mind, there was no such thing as critical theory, there
was no coherent doctrine. Adorno wrote critical essays on cultural
matters and apart from that he taught seminars on Hegel. He brought
a specific Marxist background into play – that’s how it was’ (ibid., p. 171).
Demirovic’s scrupulous reconstruction of Adorno’s practice as a teacher
led him to a different conclusion: ‘The central themes of critical theory
were discussed in great detail in the seminars. And with the Dialectic of