concede—namely, that there were real
objects in the world, that they were
made from other things, and that these
things underwent real transformations.
The notion of a material cause was held
by the “realist” schools, most notably
the Samkhya, Nyaya-Vaisheshika,
and Vishishthadvaita Vedanta. It was
opposed by the Buddhist schools, whose
assumption that reality was constantly
changing made the notion of real things
problematic. It was also opposed by the
Advaita Vedantaschool, whose starting
assumption was that ultimately there
was only one “real” thing—the formless
Brahman(Supreme Reality)—and thus
that the notion of anything becoming
anything else was in error.
Upadhi
(“obstruction”) In Indian logic, a coun-
terexample that renders an inference
(anumana) invalid by showing that the
reason (hetu) given as evidence for the
initial assertion (sadhya) is not invari-
ably true. For example, the inference
that “there is smoke because there is
fire” was judged invalid because of the
counterexample of the red-hot iron ball,
which was considered fiery but not
smoky. Since the red-hot iron ball was a
class of fiery things that did not smoke,
it showed that the reason given for the
inference did not account for every case
of the thing to be proved (sadhya)—and
thus raised the possibility that there
were other such cases as well. This
invalid inference fails the requirement
known as pervasion (vyapti), in which
the reason must account for every
possible case; this is critical for validity
in an inference. Needless to say, the
search for such counterexamples was an
essential part of Indian logic, since
one such example could discredit an
opponent’s argument. For further
information and elaboration, see
Karl H. Potter (ed.), Presuppositions of
India’s Philosophies, 1972.
Upamana
(“analogy”) According to some philo-
sophical schools, upamana was one of
the pramanas, or the means by which
human beings can gain true and accu-
rate knowledge. The classic example of
this pramana describes a traveler going
to a certain region who is told that he
will encounter a certain animal that
looks somewhat like a cow; upon going
there this analogy helps him identify the
animal. Some philosophical schools
deny that this is a separate pramana
and classify it as a variety of inference
(anumana). Those who accept it as a
fourth pramana—primarily the Nyaya-
Vaisheshikaschool—stress that accord-
ing to the rules of inference, a valid
inference must be grounded in previous
perceptions. In the case of the traveler,
his ability to identify is not based on
any differences drawn from previous
perceptions of that type of animal, since
he has never before seen the type of
animal he actually encounters. He
knows what it is because it looks
“somewhat like a cow.” Thus an
additional pramana was needed to
account for this. See also philosophy.Upanayana
(“bringing-near”) Samskara
Traditionally, the eleventh of the life
cycle ceremonies (samskaras), in which
a young man received a religious initia-
tionthat functioned as a symbolic “sec-
ond birth,” conferring on him new
capacities and responsibilities. This cer-
emony marks the symbolic end of child-
hood and, as with many such rites of
passage, the creation of a new social
identity. After this rite the initiate
becomes a brahmacharin, the first of
the stages of life (ashramas) for a
“twice-born” man. This initiation gives
the entitlement and the obligation to
study the Vedas, the oldest and most
authoritative Hindu religious texts, and
according to the traditional model, the
young man would have done this while
living in the household of his guru. WithUpanayana (“bringing-near”) Samskara