must be grounded in perception
(pratyaksha), the most direct means of
knowledge, and must ultimately appeal
to perception for evidence.
A classic inference includes three
terms: a hypothesis (pratijna), a rea-
son (hetu), and examples (drshtanta),
each of which is made up of parts.
One part of the hypothesis is the idea
to be proved (sadhya), which is predi-
cated on a certain class of objects,
called the paksha. In the statement
“there is fire on this mountain,” the
sadhya is the assertion that there is
fire, and the paksha is the particular
mountain. The object mentioned in
the paksha must also appear in the
second term, the hetu, along with the
stated reason. In the example cited
above, the hetu could be “because
there is smoke on this mountain.”
As proof, it was necessary to cite pos-
itive and negative examples, known as
the sapakshaand vipaksha, respectively.
An appropriate sapaksha could be “like
kitchen,” since ancient kitchens had
both fire and smoke; a vipaksha could be
“unlike lake,” since lakes contain neither
of these.
This general form of an inference
is subject to numerous tests for
validity; one of the most important of
these is vyapti, the requirement that
the reason given must account for
all cases of the idea to be proved. For
further information see Karl H. Potter
(ed.), Presuppositions of India’s
Philosophies, 1972.
Anushtubh
By far the most widely used meterin
Sanskrit poetry, composed of two
lines of sixteen syllables each with
eight syllables per half line. The metric
pattern for each half line is based on
the distinction between “heavy” and
“light” syllables. A heavy syllable is any
syllable with a long vowel or conso-
nant cluster; all other syllables are
light. According to the prescribed pat-
tern, the fifth syllable of each half line
should be light, the sixth heavy, and
the seventh alternately heavy and
light. The anushtubh’s simplicity
makes it the meter of choice for many
religious texts, including much of the
Bhagavad Gita.Anyathakhyati
(“discrimination of something else”)
A theory of errorthat aims to explain
why people make errors in judgment,
such as the stock example of mistak-
ing the flash of a seashell for a piece
of silver. This particular theory of
error originated with the Naiyayika
philosophical school. Like the Purva
Mimamsa philosopher Prabhakara,
the Naiyayikas believe that the simple
judgments “that object is silvery” and
“silver is silvery” are both true and
indisputable. Whereas Prabhakara
explains the error as an error of omis-
sion, in which one fails to notice the
non-relationship between these judg-
ments, the Naiyayikas explain this as
an error of commission, by projecting
something that actually is not there.
In Naiyayikan metaphysics all
objects and their attributes are con-
nected by a dependent relationship
known as inherence (samavaya),
which in this case connects a silvery
color with two different objects: ele-
mental silver, and a shell. They believe
that the perceiver is projecting a wrong
inherence relationship (silver) onto the
perceived object (shell).
The Naiyayikas can claim this
projection is real because they
accept the reality of nonexistent
things (e.g., the nonexistence of
a crocodile in my bathtub). For
the Naiyayikas all such projections
are rooted in karmic dispositions
stemming from avidya, or primal
ignorance, specifically the greed
for silver that prompts people to
look for such items of value. For
further information see Bijayananda
Kar, The Theories of Error in Indian
Philosophy; 1978 and Karl H. PotterAnyathakhyati