Between Truth and Lie: The Ambiguity of Oracles
The reputation of some oracular sanctuaries endured for a thousand years, and this
demonstrates that the Greeks believed in oracles and warning signs. Many inscrip-
tions record acts done ‘‘in accordance with the will of an oracle,’’ confirming the
literary tradition (e.g.,IGi^3 40, 64–7), and examples of people disobeying oracles
they have been given are exceptional (Herodotus 7.148–9). The skeptical Thucydides –
and in his wake Polybius (36.17) – never doubted the authority of the Delphic oracle,
even if he emphasizes the frequent manipulations of the prophecies given, and the
consequences of this on the course of events (Marinatos 1981:47–55). Plato, as a
good pupil of Socrates, was of the same view, and very few and far between were those
who denied the principle of divination, such as Xenophanes and then the Epicureans.
In the Peace of Nicias of 421, the first clause of the treaty specified free access to
Delphi for the opponents (Thucydides 5.18.2).
That said, three substantial and related problems confronted the Greeks:
(1) the ambiguity of oracles; (2) charlatanism; and (3) the forgery of oracular
responses.
1 The ambiguity of oracles derived from two things: the mode of revelation itself
and errors made in the process of prediction. The cry of an owl, heard on the left,
a dream, or the words of the Pythia at Delphi are naturally vague and always leave
room for doubt and interpretation (Heraclitus fr. 93 D-K). The medium too,
a finite human being, was an inadequate instrument for authentic revelation
(Plutarch,Pythian Oracles 404b–405a). As for erroneous predictions, unless
one actually believes in Apollo, one must admit a real percentage of error. But
the Greeks could not consider their gods liars. The reconciliation of this contra-
diction entailed accepting the possibility of human error in the decoding of
oracles: the responses of the gods, truthfully spoken, were accordingly considered
ambiguous, ‘‘oblique.’’ Sophocles’ Oedipus does not understand the oracles and
becomes embroiled in misfortune. Herodotus’ Croesus (1.46–91) is told by the
Pythia that if he takes up war against Persia he will destroy a great empire. In his
defeat he destroys his own kingdom. Human error was the only possible explan-
ation from the moment that belief in divination became fixed in Greek patterns of
thought and was justified by tradition, which the Greeks seldom deviated from
(Isocrates,Areopagiticus30). Accordingly, ambiguity soon became established as
the hallmark of oracles in literature, even though epigraphic cases are quite rare
(Fontenrose 1978:236; Lane Fox 1997:250–4).
2 On top of error came charlatanism. Prediction was trustworthy, but some predic-
tions were more trustworthy than others. First in rank came the infallible oracles,
whose power was guaranteed by their antiquity: Delphi, Dodona, Olympia,
Siwah, then Claros and Didyma, amongst others. Faith in oracles was confirmed
by the – legendary – punishment inflicted upon Croesus, who tested them
to ensure their truthfulness (Herodotus 1.46.2–1.48.1). Also reliable were the
oracles that offered a personal contact, an ‘‘autopsy,’’ with the divinity, a charac-
teristic that was an ancient one, but one that became essential in the hellenistic
period.
Divination 147