of everything in theRepublic. One can thus see already, on the basis of the early and
middle dialogues, why later generations would want to equate the good itself with
god, and with the demiurge, the divine craftsman, of theTimaeus.
TheLysismakes a further methodological and ontological point in connection with
its topic, ‘‘what is dear’’ (218–20). The point is methodological and epistemological
to the extent that it pertains to a method of investigation and definition. In deter-
mining what is dear, Socrates suggests that what is dear is sobecause ofsomething and
for the sake ofsomething: for example medical science is dear to the patient because of
his illness and for the sake of his health. But that for the sake of which something is
dear, here health, is also itself dear. If it is dear, is it dear for the sake of something?
With any such regress, where one is led from one question to another, there must be a
point at which one arrives at a firm ground, a starting point and beginning,arche ̄.
Stated thus apodictically, this looks like an arbitrary demand; but one can supply the
implicit condition: one must arrive at a beginning ‘‘if there is to be any explanatory
power in the process at all.’’ Read this way, the statement loses its arbitrariness and
instead just distinguishes fruitful search and explanation from an asking that is
pointless because it is endless.
The point is ontological because this thing which turns out to be a first beginning,
which is designated as the first dear (thing),pro ̄ton philon, has in each case a concrete
reality. It is that ‘‘at which all the others end’’ as their metaphorical point of arrival
and completion (220). In this context, Socrates speaks of ‘‘us,’’ by which must be
meant all human beings, as being ‘‘in between,’’metaxy, good and bad. This notion
ofmetaxyis also encountered in theSymposium.TheSymposiumis a dialogue containing
a series of speeches in praise of the god Eros. When it is Socrates’ turn to talk about
the god (199–212), he startles his audience by claiming that Eros is not all-beautiful,
all-knowing, all-powerful. Here the interjection of one of the interlocutors is that
Socrates cannot possibly mean that Eros is ugly and bad. ‘‘Indeed not,’’ replies
Socrates, and he reports that when he was young he was taught by a priestess that
not all that is not beautiful is ugly, just as not all that is not wise is stupid, but that
there is something in between,metaxy; between ignorance and wisdom or knowledge
is correct opinion without argument and proof. In that way, Eros is desiring the
beautiful and good as being in between what is beautiful and good and, on the other
hand, what is ugly and bad. But how can a god like Eros be anything but beautiful
and good and wise? To that the answer is that Eros is not a god but a great and
powerfuldaimo ̄n. In Homer,daimo ̄nis often a synonym fortheos, god. But at Hesiod
Works and Days 122 daimonesis the designation for the golden race of men once this
race died: ‘‘they, now, aredaimonesbecause of the will of great Zeus, noble, earth-
bound, guardians of mortal men, giving riches: and that they hold as their kingly
prerogative.’’ Whether Hesiod knew that etymologicallydaimo ̄nis ‘‘distributor’’ is
irrelevant; Plato hardly did. Nor is it important whether Hesiod is the originator of a
particular belief indaimones, or whether Plato was influenced in his choice of the
word by Hesiod. Already atApology27 the worddaimonesis defined as either
referring to gods or to children of gods; in the myth at the end of thePhaedo, each
soul has adaimo ̄nallocated to it to guide it through the underworld (107, 108, 113):
when Plato introduces the termdaimo ̄nfor Eros atSymposium202, he provides it
with a new definition: what isdaimonion, of the sort of adaimo ̄n, is in between,
metaxy, god and mortal.
392 Fritz-Gregor Herrmann