Soren Kierkegaard

ian philosophy and of the whole of professorial philosophy.” So much did
Kierkegaard fall head over heels in love with the word—which was per-
fectly suited to the “age of the philosophy of lies”—that for a moment he
became envious of the German language. But then he reflected on the
matter and, in an argument that is as dubious as it is charming, Kierkegaard
explained why the word did not occur in the Danish language: “We Danes
do not have the word, nor is the thing the word designates characteristic of
us Danes. The character of the Danish nation does not really contain the
possibility of being a windbag.” Danes can breathe a bit easier, but not for
long, because Kierkegaard continues: “On the other hand, we Danes have
another shortcoming—alas, acorresponding shortcoming—for which the
Danish language indeed has a word, a word that is perhaps absent from the
German language:windsucker. It is commonly used in connection with
horses, but it can be applied more generally. And this is more or less the
situation: a German to make wind—and a Dane to suck it in. Germans and
Danes have long had this sort of relationship to one another.” And with
this, A. S. and S. A. were reunited in their inverted symmetry: A. S. fought
against the “windbags,” S. A. against the “windsuckers.”
In other respects, Kierkegaard primarily noted their differences. To sim-
plify the situation slightly, Kierkegaard spoke ethically about psychological
matters, while Schopenhauer spoke psychologically about ethical matters.
For Schopenhauer, blessedness consisted inbecoming objective, pure, disin-
terested, and contemplative, while for Kierkegaard, on the other hand, what
was important was to become subjective and to relate oneself passionately
to one’s eternal blessedness. Kierkegaard, however, was less concerned with
Schopenhauer’s wholly abstract positions than with his existential praxis,
which he criticized harshly in quite a number of journal entries. One partic-
ular episode in Schopenhauer’s life made the problem acutely visible. In
1837, the Norwegian Scientific Society proposed the following question for
agold-medalessay:“CantheFreedomoftheHumanWillBeDemonstrated
on the Basis of Self-Consciousness?” Schopenhauer submitted an answer
and won the gold medal. Scarcely was this accomplished before the Danish
Scientific Society proposed a related question, formulated in such byzantine
language as could probably only have occurred to Professor Sibbern: “Is the
Source and the Foundation of Morality to Be Sought in the Development
of the Idea of Morality as It Is Immediately Available to Consciousness and
in the Fundamental Moral Notions that Emanate from It, or in Another
Source of Knowledge?” Schopenhauer also submitted an answer to this
question, but he did not win the prize. Rather, he was the object of a great
deal of criticism because, in the view of the judging committee, he had not
only misunderstood the question and committed a number of formal errors,