rested in the hands of a handpicked, all-powerful executive committee, vir-
tually the same group that directed the NCRSRM. Although spokesmen
for the eastern Europeans ranted against the oligarchic structure, the ste-
wards and their tactics of quiet personal diplomacy won hands down. Since
the new agency was also a victory for the New York group, Marshall felt
compelled to placate the other organizations with a public offer of cooper-
ation. At least for the moment, the readiness of the Schiff circle to compro-
mise succeeded in preserving rule by a few. Disaffection did not evaporate,
but the episode underscored the need of reconciling uptown and down-
town. Judge Mayer Sulzberger faulted both sides—uptown’s belief in the
superiority of the established Jews and downtown’s “arrogant assumption
... that mere numbers give wisdom.”^78
Schiff, who saw the new organization as a means for uniting American
Jewry, briefly considered not joining the executive committee. “The
monopolizing of leadership by a few,” he said, “should gradually be made
to cease.” He had not changed from an elitist into a proponent of democ-
racy, but overburdened by communal tasks, he thought it might be wiser to
leave the field to younger men. Nevertheless, a national defense organiza-
tion without Schiff would have been a contradiction in terms. He was per-
suaded to serve, and for a time he acted as chairman of the agency’s finance
committee. Sulzberger was chosen first president, but policy, now covering
domestic as well as foreign matters, was set principally by Schiff and two of
his loyal associates, Marshall and Cyrus Adler. As in prior years the banker’s
forte lay primarily in linking American Jewish leaders with their European
counterparts. More often than not it was Schiff rather than the AJC who
decided on American cooperation with the Anglo-Jewish Association, the
Alliance Israélite Universelle, and the Hilfsverein der Deutschen Juden.
His foreign contacts served him well, especially when he tackled interna-
tional issues like Russian Jewry and emigration from eastern Europe.^79
The New York stewards faced a more serious challenge to their leadership
in 1908. When Police Commissioner Theodore Bingham charged that
Jews, the new immigrants in particular, accounted for 50 percent of the
city’s criminals, both uptown and downtown felt challenged to respond. At
first uptown, more worried than angry, held back. They could not honestly
deny Jewish crime, and they preferred to avoid public controversy. But since
their reputation, both with downtown and with non-Jews, was at stake, they
decided to act. As Schiff explained, uptown wasn’t responsible for the vice
and crime among the immigrants, but since Americans held them respon-
sible, they had to do something. Downtown spokesmen, bitter over the
stewards’ delay in responding to Bingham, not only lashed out at the com-
missioner but embarked on a plan to create an all-inclusive kehillah, or Jewish
112 Jacob H. Schiff