of Minister Charles Emory Smith and to ask for an American protest
against Russian policy.
The stewards gained a respectful and even sympathetic hearing. Influen-
tial Jews like Straus, Seligman, and Schiff could not be easily dismissed, es-
pecially since Blaine admitted the falsity of Smith’s reports. Moreover, the
Jewish leaders shared the secretary’s aversion to public protest meetings
and were willing to keep the Jews in line. In tried accommodationist fash-
ion, they made their case an American rather than a Jewish issue by arguing
that the persecution swelled the volume of immigration into the United
States. If America could prove that Russian policy caused the mass entry of
destitute refugees, its national interest justified a rebuke of the czar. At a
time when the country was testing its wings in international diplomacy, no
overriding economic or strategic reasons dictated appeasement of Russia.
Meanwhile, to show their own good faith the stewards pressured Euro-
pean Jewish leaders to exercise greater control over the emigrant flow. At
one international conference in 1890, Schiff pushed the need for proper
distribution. The next year, foreseeing a major catastrophe in Russia, he
suggested that the United States join with the major European countries in
asking Russia for a hearing on the subject of staggered Jewish emigration
over a period of years. The administration shied away from any direct con-
frontation with the czarist regime, but Harrison agreed to appoint a com-
mission, headed by John Weber, to investigate the conditions that led to
emigration. Hoping for at least an indirect slap at Russia, Schiff and the
others arranged for friends in Europe to brief the commissioners.^5
Blaine’s instructions to the American legation for informal representa-
tions to Russia and the pro-Jewish report by the Weber commission were
small but significant victories, showing Russia that the United States had
taken an interest in the problem. Jewish diplomacy scored another victory
with the appointment of Smith’s successor. Determined now to secure a
representative in St. Petersburg who was alert and sympathetic to the Jew-
ish plight, Schiff, Straus, Seligman, and Myer Isaacs (president of the
Baron de Hirsch Fund) successfully pressured Harrison into giving the
post to Andrew D. White, a former president of Cornell University. They
followed up the appointment by maintaining contact with the new minister
and feeding him relevant information. Doubtless, White also read the
American Hebrew, the newspaper of the Jewish establishment; because of
Russian censorship, the paper was delivered to him by diplomatic pouch. A
cooperative minister was a significant asset, and since White was retained
in Russia after the election of 1892, he was pivotal in easing the stewards’
approach to the Cleveland administration. The Russians usually influenced
American diplomats to take the side of czarist policies, but White proved
to be the exception.^6
Captivity and Redemption 127one line short