More daring were Schiff’s attempts to stand by the anti-Russia cam-
paign even in the face of American favors to the czarist government. In
1890 he advised against Jewish participation in festivities honoring a Rus-
sian warship in the New York harbor lest the impression arise that “New
York Jews are wanting in self-respect.” He explained: “Have we a right to
ask sympathy... in behalf of our Russian coreligionists and the condem-
nation of their oppressors if we hasten to do honor to those who come
here officially representing the Czar’s government?” A more delicate situ-
ation arose less than two years later in connection with a severe famine in
Russia. The American government turned down a Russian request for
foodstuffs, but members of the cabinet suggested that it would be good
policy for New York’s Jews to send a private relief ship. The stewards were
caught in a bind. Not to undertake the project might annoy the govern-
ment or tarnish the Jewish philanthropic image. On the other hand, the
supplies could be used by Russia as proof that American Jews were uncon-
cerned by the Jewish situation or that Jewish suffering drew money into
the country. Either way, Russian Jewry stood to lose. Although Baron de
Hirsch advised against Jewish relief, Schiff and Oscar Straus took a middle
course. They turned down the cabinet’s suggestion, but they supported the
relief drive of the Chamber of Commerce. By that move they lent a Jewish
presence to the general campaign and simultaneously positioned them-
selves to avert any potential harm to the Jewish cause. In a speech before
the Chamber of Commerce, Schiff defended Jewish charity with great pas-
sion, but he warned against supplies falling into the hands of corrupt czar-
ist officials. He went on to challenge the popular belief that Russia was a
friend of the United States. Would a friend, he asked, force its exiles upon
America?
To avert Jewish criticism of American appeals for famine relief, Schiff
reminded his fellow Jews in a letter to the American Hebrew that their
quarrel was neither with the Russians nor with the American government
but solely with the czarist regime. True, Christian America had been less
than forthcoming in relief for Jewish refugees from Russia, but the coun-
try had done more than any other nation by keeping its doors open to the
immigrants. Besides, as a small minority, Jews could not afford to ignore
American appeals. Therefore, it behooved them to help the famine suffer-
ers but, he insisted, only if they had first contributed generously to Jewish
relief.^10 Obviously concerned lest Jews incite an adverse public reaction,
Schiff was unafraid to call attention to specific Jewish interests. In an age
when most Jews preferred not to admit publicly to such interests, his was a
refreshing voice.
Within some twenty years, Jewish leaders had fixed on several strategies
for securing the rights of Russian Jews. They lobbied with Republican and
Democratic administrations, cultivated public opinion through the press,
Captivity and Redemption 129