and quietly encouraged non-Jews arrayed against the czar. (At times Schiff
also thought of underwriting a pro-Jewish press in Russia itself.)^11 Gradu-
ally, as the Russian situation deteriorated, what had begun as Jewish reac-
tions to specific crises became fixed patterns.
By the turn of the century, Schiff was embarked on yet another approach,
that of closing America’s and perhaps even the world’s money markets to
Russian loans. Radically different from the other strategies, it changed the
Jew from the seeker of goodwill into an active adversary who relied on his
own power. The banker mustered sound business reasons for his stand:
Russia’s distasteful political conditions repelled American capitalists; it was
unwise to tie up American capital in loans unattractive to investors; Russia’s
huge indebtedness in European money markets boded ill for its creditors.
Above all, however, was the banker’s aversion to dealing with Russia. “I
should not participate in any business with the Russian Government so
long as it maintains and so ruthlessly enforces its special legislation against
the Jews,” he pledged. It mattered little to him, he told Paul Warburg, that
some important European Jewish bankers behaved differently. Rather, he
took pride in having successfully stymied Russia’s dealings with American
bankers after 1900.^12
Acknowledging Schiff’s financial power early on, Russia wooed the
American banker for many years. Around 1900 the government sent Adolf
Rothstein, a baptized Jew who was director of the St. Petersburg’s Interna-
tional Bank of Commerce, to offer Kuhn, Loeb the position of favored fi-
nancial agent for the marketing of Russian treasury notes. In addition to
large profits, Rothstein promised that the minister of finance would work
for the repeal of the anti-Jewish May Laws. “This we flatly refused,” Schiff
related to Lord Rothschild, “telling Mr. Rothstein that promises were
cheap, and that action would have to precede Russia’s application to the
American money markets before our cooperation could be had, and that
until then we should bring all the influence we could command to bear
against Russia getting a foothold in the American money markets.”^13
Bleeding Russia financially became Schiff’s personal weapon and one that
he wielded most effectively during the next decade, a period that witnessed
recurring pogroms and a Russian empire in turmoil.
“One of the Most Dangerous Men... against Us”When Theodore Roosevelt assumed the presidency in 1901, Schiff’s role as
lobbyist with the government expanded significantly. His reputation in the
business world had reached a high, and after the Northern Pacific affair he
130 Jacob H. Schiff