and the charge that their revolutionary activities were responsible for any
persecution was utterly false. As a reminder of Schiff’s status, the press
noted that he was the first of the committee to enter Witte’s room.^34
At the three-hour conference the Jews reviewed the Russian situation in
detail. Loans were not officially on the agenda, but the implication was
clear enough when the stewards repeated Schiff’s stock formula: Russian
goodwill in America was endangered if Jews did not receive their rights.
Witte, who was sensitive to popular dislike of Russia caused by the Jewish
question, agreed in principle to equal rights. Unlike the Americans, how-
ever, he insisted on gradual rather than immediate emancipation. (Accord-
ing to one prominent American Jew who had not participated in the con-
ference, Witte attributed anti-Semitism to racial, not religious reasons. But
since the statement was loaded with harmful innuendos for all Jews, it was
not divulged by either side.) A loyal supporter of the autocratic system,
Witte had come to realize the necessity of political reforms. The Jews were
impressed by him, and they in turn thought they had impressed him.^35
Participants reported that only Schiff behaved antagonistically. When,
for example, Witte urged the stewards to use their influence to keep Rus-
sian Jews out of the revolutionary camp, Schiff denied that the Americans
had that power. Besides, “is it not probable that the young men became
revolutionists in the hope that a republic will grant them just laws which
are denied under the rule of the Emperor?” Four years later, Witte de-
scribed Schiff’s behavior: “I have never met such a Jew as Schiff. Proud,
dignified, conscious of his power, he declared to me solemnly that so long
as the Tsar’s government would continue its anti-Jewish policy, he would
exert every effort to make it impossible for Russia to get a copeck in the
United States. He banged the table with his fist and declared that a govern-
ment which indulged in massacres and inhuman persecution on religious
grounds was not to be trusted.”^36
In the end, Schiff said that the conference had been worthwhile, per-
haps just because he had irritated Witte. The president also heard that
Schiff had prejudiced Witte against the Jewish cause, but outwardly the
Russian official remained conciliatory. He dared not risk any offense to
Kuhn, Loeb, and he privately assured the banker of his positive assess-
ments of American Jewish sentiments. Publicly, Witte promised to seek
amelioration of the Russian Jewish condition.^37
The meeting aroused widespread comment. Secretary Elihu Root
sneered at “certain Jews in America [who] were merely striving for notori-
ety,”^38 and secular papers talked of Jewish ultimatums or deals. On the
other hand, leading Jewish periodicals commended the stewards, as did
banker Samuel Montagu in London. Some hopefully noted reports from
St. Petersburg that certain classes of Jews would be permitted to stand for
election to the Russian Duma, but they wondered if Witte, no matter how
138 Jacob H. Schiff