Now he suggested a policy of “friendly persuasion,” by which he meant
loans to Russia, which he thought would redound to the benefit of the
Jews. He also believed that the international realignment after the Russo-
Japanese War that led Russia to seek a rapprochement with England au-
gured well. In contact with high Russian officials, Cassel told them that
“fair play” for the Jews would aid immeasurably in their country’s eco-
nomic development. Schiff, however, preferred diplomatic isolation of the
czarist regime. He was never convinced that the carrot, be it money or En-
gland’s friendship, was more efficacious than the stick. “Die Botschaft hör
ich gerne, aber mir fehlt der Glaube,” he answered his friend.^51 According
to Schiff, England’s shameful support emboldened Russia to drop even the
pretense of promising Jewish rights in exchange for loans. He himself de-
manded proof of a changed policy toward Jews when Wilenkin again urged
him in 1908 to meet with the Russian minister of finance. On that occa-
sion, the Russian gave no promises. Rather, he advised that the timing was
wrong for a discussion of the Jewish question.^52
The story goes that Cassel consulted Schiff about another tactic, a per-
sonal interview with the czar. Two oral accounts, both attributed to Schiff
and resurrected after his death, related that Cassel attempted in 1909 to see
the czar on behalf of the Jews. (A letter from Schiff to President Taft’s
brother in August 1909 also hinted mysteriously that the idea of a meeting
between a certain “individual” and the czar was under consideration.) But
although the czar liked Cassel, he refused to discuss the Jewish question
with him.^53 Since all tried roads appeared blocked, Schiff and his associates
fell back on one last idea, the use of the passport issue as the means for ef-
fecting the liberation of Russian Jewry.
Schiff versus TaftThe campaign orchestrated by the AJC and its spectacular success in forc-
ing the government to terminate a treaty with Russia, the source of the
passport impasse,^54 was a significant first in the annals of American Jewish
stewardship. It differed from the usual tactics of quiet diplomacy in three
essential ways: an ambitious public effort, it aroused popular opinion and
Congress to a near “wave of hysteria”; it injected a Jewish issue squarely
into the political forum; and it put a Jewish organization in an adversarial
position vis-à-vis the incumbent administration. It was a gamble fraught
with many dangers; failure would have meant a loss of influence with the
government and possibly an anti-Semitic reaction to open Jewish agitation.
On the scale of communal leadership the stewards also scored well. Here
too they alone fixed strategy and worked out the details of a tight, well-
coordinated campaign. The larger community went unrepresented, but the
144 Jacob H. Schiff