that “when foreign Jews are equally entitled to cross the Russian border
with other foreigners, then the Russian Government will not long be able
to insist on maintaining the scandalous restrictive laws against her own
Jews.” Therefore, one of the conditions he made in 1904 for a visit to Rus-
sia was the removal of restrictions on foreign Jews. Were the United States
successful in changing czarist policy on Americans, then, according to
Schiff’s scenario, other nations would follow suit on behalf of their citizens
and thus radically alter the course of Russian Jewish life.
The Russian situation had worsened steadily after 1906. In Schiff’s
words, pogroms had given way to “the still more brutal method of slow ex-
termination” that resulted from the crippling restrictions on Jewish settle-
ment and economic life. After a trip to Europe in 1909 he reported that no
major outbreaks had occurred, but “it is the quiet of the grave.” Since
“slow and deliberate” repression was unlikely to awaken public interest or
to prompt American action,^56 the committee called for outright abrogation
of the treaty. In a letter to TR the organization spelled out both purposes,
the rights of American Jews and the liberation of Russian Jews. A few
months later, Secretary Elihu Root told Schiff that America preferred revi-
sion to termination of the treaty and that it had so informed Russia. There
matters stood when Roosevelt left office.
More encouraging was the seeming sympathy of the incoming adminis-
tration. Taft had written the Republican pledge on the rights of passport
holders, and he had addressed the issue in campaign speeches. Lest he for-
get, Schiff pointedly reminded him of its importance for Jewish voters. Ar-
guing for American Jewish equality, Schiff added that if Protestants were
denied entry, all nations would doubtless sever diplomatic relations with
Russia. Taft promised that the matter had his special attention; and al-
though the banker was unsure whether the administration would live up to
its word, the stewards held their fire for the time being.^57
During his first year in office, Taft instructed Secretary of State Phi-
lander Knox to attend to the situation, but by February 1910 the AJC had
become increasingly impatient. Taft would do everything to satisfy another
group of citizens in a similar situation, Schiff said at an executive meeting of
the AJC. “We were simply licking the hands of the President. We do not re-
spect ourselves sufficiently to come out boldly and demand our rights....
We have been fed on similar promises and assurances for many years,...
but four more years will pass, and nothing will have been accomplished.”
He urged strong action: “Unless the President is made to understand what
it is we want and that we want it very much, there will be a revolt on the
part of the Russian-Jewish Citizens which could not be checked.”
Although Schiff, a loyal Republican, professed a “warm attachment” to
Taft personally, he was determined to hold the president to his campaign
promises. Taft was “inclined to take things easy,” and he had to understand
146 Jacob H. Schiff