The disastrous conference gave the green light to the AJC to make pub-
lic the fight for abrogation. They planned and executed a masterful cam-
paign that publicized Russian discrimination against American passport
holders, they encouraged pro-abrogation rallies in various cities, and they
labored painstakingly to garner political support on the state and federal
levels. Initially, the stewards envisioned a campaign that would last until
the presidential election of 1912, but the overwhelming support they re-
ceived allowed them to telescope the schedule into ten months. Schiff, who
threw himself enthusiastically into the campaign, guided or at least passed
on all strategy concerning publicity, finances, and pressure on lawmakers.
In contact with interested organizations like the Friends of Russian Free-
dom^62 and in constant correspondence with prominent political figures, he
and the AJC displayed a keen understanding of the basic rules of minority
politics: the need to present a united Jewish front, the advantages of non-
Jewish allies and spokesmen, the importance of tapping individual experts
or men of influence within a far-flung Jewish network, and above all, the
careful definition of the cause in American rather than Jewish terms. They
made the moral and legal wrong against American passport holders, not
rights for Russians, the focus of attention. To pressure the government on
what rightly belonged to its citizens held out a greater chance of success
than to beg Russia for favors to Jews.
Schiff himself exploded a minor bombshell at a conference of leading
Jews with New York’s senators, Root and O’Gorman. Offended by Root’s
opposition to abrogation, he told how Ambassador Rockhill, supposedly
working toward a solution, had stated publicly that business interests over-
shadowed the passport issue. He also revealed what Wilenkin had told him
about Russia’s negotiations with Taft’s friend, businessman John Hays
Hammond. Although Taft was ignorant of the entire episode, and despite
Hammond’s countercharge that Schiff’s account was “an unqualified false-
hood, a cowardly lie,” the story left the impression that Hammond had in-
fluenced the president and that the administration ranked financial profit
above American rights.^63
On his own, Schiff followed up the February conference with a letter to
Taft repeating his criticisms of the president’s stance. Proving that the
banker’s verbal outburst had been more than a momentary loss of temper,
the letter put the president on the defensive. His bitterness toward Schiff
grew as the abrogation campaign progressed, and he spread the word
among his friends that the Jewish leader was bent on destroying him polit-
ically. “[Schiff] has been consumed with fury because he could not control
the Administration and sacrifice all national interests to the gratification of
his vanity and that of some wealthy Hebrews,” the president said. To the
editor-in-chief of the New York Tribune he wrote that he was threatened
with the “formidable” Jewish vote. “It... can easily be roused on such an
Captivity and Redemption 149