of two million Russians seemed possible; and if a similar idea was adopted
in England, another two million in Canada.^18 Although Schiff repeatedly
stated that the Russian-Jewish question had to be settled in Russia, he re-
mained skeptical of amelioration by an autocratic Russian government.
Emigration was a necessity, and he strove to keep all options open for large
numbers of the czar’s Jewish subjects.
The objective was straightforward and seemingly simple, but each step
required intricate machinery. In Russia, agents had to approach prospec-
tive emigrants, apprise them of the opportunities of western settlement,
overcome their fears of an area bereft of familiar companionship, and fi-
nally, persuade them to book passage for Galveston rather than an eastern
port. The agents also bore responsibility for encouraging “proper” emi-
grants or, as Schiff explained, “an element able to cope with new condi-
tions: younger, sturdy people, ready to work of every kind and nature.” (At
first, Schiff stipulated that emigrants agree to work on the Sabbath. Under
pressure he compromised; emigrants had to understand in advance that
strict Sabbath observance was in most cases impossible.) The next step was
to transport the emigrants to Bremen and see them aboard steamships of
the North German-Lloyd Company, the one line that sailed directly to
Galveston every three weeks. Meantime, on the American side, staff work-
ers had to ferret out employment opportunities in various communities.
Once the immigrants landed at Galveston after an arduous voyage of three
weeks, they had to be received, moved through government inspection,
and sheltered temporarily until dispatched to the available jobs. Where
possible, jobs were matched to immigrant skills—carpenters were sent to
furniture towns, butchers to stockyards.^19 In sum the Galveston plan was a
formidable operation whose success depended on the efficiency of each
link in a long chain.
Only a Schiff could have dared to undertake a project of such magni-
tude, and only a Schiff came so well armed. His reputation in non-Jewish
as well as Jewish circles, both in Europe and the United States, was at a
high, thanks to his business successes, his diplomatic pressure on behalf of
eastern European Jewry, and his recent role as financial angel of Japan in
its war against Russia. His wealth and position afforded him the means to
underwrite the American side of the plan and the contacts for enlisting ex-
perienced and expert associates on two continents. Just because the plan
was his, it was assured the attention of prominent Americans and full
coverage in the general and Jewish press. When he advised that the idea
be pushed at conventions of national organizations, the B’nai B’rith, the
UAHC, and the National Conference of Jewish Charities complied. Not
the least of Schiff’s assets were his stubborn determination, his energy,
and his concern for administrative details that he applied to the “uphill”
work.^20
In Search of a Refuge 161