ropean effort that Schiff considered necessary for assuring proper recruit-
ment. And when Russia temporarily closed down most of ITO’s stations in
1908, thus jeopardizing the entire operation, he could do little but ask Sec-
retary of Commerce and Labor Straus to voice his approval of the Galves-
ton movment and thereby shore up ITO’s credibility with the czarist
government. When ITO ran out of funds (Zangwill relied heavily on
Rothschild money), Schiff was powerless to lend aid lest the entire plan ap-
pear to Americans as stimulated or assisted immigration.^31
Another crucial blow to the Galveston movement was delivered by the
American government. As Bernard Marinbach has ably recounted, in 1910
the movement became a favorite target of restrictionist and anti-Jewish im-
migration officials in both Washington and the port city. Persuaded that the
operation violated the 1907 immigration law by actively soliciting immigra-
tion, the officials attempted a crackdown through the use of deportation or-
ders. Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Labor Benjamin Cable said that
if he were to exclude those who fell under the LPC ban, he would exclude
them all. To be sure, a few deportations were on Galveston’s record since
the very beginning, but now the numbers rose dramatically. Cases could be
appealed, and although some decisions were reversed, permanent damage
was done to the movement’s popularity among prospective immigrants.^32
This time, Schiff, who had always insisted on strict compliance with
American law, swung into action. He admitted privately that greater care in
the selection process might have avoided some deportations, but he was
firmly convinced that sheer malevolence on the part of American officials
accounted for the crisis. Although the deported “martyrs” captured his
sympathy, he couldn’t reimburse them lest he validate thereby the charges
of assisted immigration. He warned that if the movement itself were
crushed by government policy, someone would be punished—“not the
man lower down, but the man higher up.” To be sure, Schiff’s relations
with the Taft administration were far less than cordial. Taft had reneged on
his promise to keep Oscar Straus in the cabinet, and he had dismissed
Schiff’s recommendation of another friend, Louis Marshall, for Supreme
Court justice. Moreover, at that very moment, Schiff and Taft were at log-
gerheads over Russia’s refusal to honor the passports of American Jews. But
the powerful banker, who was still a loyal Republican, enjoyed consider-
able leverage. Enlisting the help of Congressman William Bennet of New
York and a strong legal team of Galveston supporters, he orchestrated a de-
fense of the movement that challenged the deportation orders and specifi-
cally Assistant Secretary Cable. In August 1910, Schiff wrote an indignant
letter to Cable (really meant for Taft) that accused his department of “wan-
tonly” destroying the movement. When Cable stood firm, Schiff called for
his resignation. He told Taft’s secretary that “we cannot again enter upon
the legitimate—and I aver—desirable and public-spirited work we have
166 Jacob H. Schiff