an influx of discontented settlers from Argentina as well as of the instability
of Latin American nations.^40 The latter objection, however, did not figure
in his counterproposal to seek an outlet in Mexico.
Both Schiff and Ernest Cassel had substantial business interests in Mex-
ico before 1900. The two men cooperated in financing various railway en-
terprises, and Schiff acted as Cassel’s representative in the affairs of one
line. In 1891, confiding his skepticism about the Argentinian scheme to his
friend, Schiff suggested that Mexico was a better alternative. It offered fer-
tile and cheap land, it appeared free of prejudice, and the government ac-
tively invited immigration. Since Mexico was closer than Argentina, colo-
nies there could be more easily supervised. Schiff’s case grew stronger
when he learned that the Mexican government officially endorsed his pro-
ject. In his mind the pieces began to come together: the needy eastern Eu-
ropeans, a welcoming country, and an Alliance Israélite Universelle to flesh
out the venture.^41
At first, Schiff asked Cassel to recommend Mexico to the baron. The
opinion of Cassel, who was chosen by Hirsch as a director of the ICA,
would carry more weight. The baron in turn did not reject the scheme, but
he wanted sure prospects of a fair return for the enormous capital invest-
ment. The goal of colonizing perhaps five million people required a serious
investigation from a business, not a philanthropic, standpoint. He also stip-
ulated that while Europeans handled the financial side and the transporta-
tion of emigrants, Americans had to assume the responsibility of manage-
ment. At this point, Schiff took up negotiations directly with Hirsch.
Drawing on the experience of American Mormons who had left Utah for
Mexico, Schiff assured the baron that “certain parts of Mexico... offer the
settlers every opportunity which can be expected anywhere from prudent
and diligent work.” He promised to pay for an investigation of suitable
Mexican lands, but he insisted that the baron be prepared to follow
through if the report was favorable. Agreeing in principle to a businesslike
enterprise, he warned frankly that since American Jews were bearing the
heavy costs of immigration, the scheme would find few investors in the
United States. In this episode business habits tempered philanthropy.
For a few months things looked promising. The baron was prepared to
listen, and Schiff, in contact with friends at home and abroad, sought out
agents for the mission. Meanwhile, the president of the Mexican Central
Railroad, Schiff’s chief client in that country, approached the banker, asking
that Russian emigrants be directed to lands owned by the railroad. Although
he said that he and some friends were eager to help for humanitarian rea-
sons, both he and Schiff understood that Jewish settlement augured profits
for the Central line. Nevertheless, when Schiff learned that the immigrants
would be faced with problems of low wages and severe competition, hope
for financial gain and for the project itself died. The ill-fated plan resembled
170 Jacob H. Schiff