anti-Jewish threats against Jewish financiers from a group called the Vigi-
lance Committee.^4 Similar criticism emanated from Paris, where Clemen-
ceau maintained that Schiff’s pro-German statement was aimed at depriv-
ing the Allies of their rightful victory. Since Germany attacked the peace
message from a son of the fatherland even more bitterly, it was clear, first,
that he had aroused the suspicions of both sides and, second, that neither
side was prepared to end the conflict.^5
Until 1917, Schiff continued to call for an end to “this holocaust.” Re-
peatedly he suggested to the president and the secretary of state and to the
public as well that the United States offer to mediate. Nevertheless, his
support of the American Neutral Conference Committee, a small group of
prominent persons who wanted mediation by Wilson, drew public criti-
cism. Charged again with being pro-German, Schiff grew increasingly pes-
simistic. He predicted a long war that would end only in a draw, leaving
both sides physically, materially, and morally bankrupt.^6
More than sympathy with Germany made Schiff a champion of an early
peace and of American neutrality. With relatives and friends serving in the
opposing forces, he agonized over the horrors of the war. An early peace
served his business interests as well. Like other businessmen, Schiff had
been an outspoken supporter of international peace as far back as the
Spanish-American War and as recently as the prewar arbitration treaties
negotiated by Secretary William Jennings Bryan. A member of the Friends
for Peace Society, he also served as an officer of the New York Peace Soci-
ety and the League to Enforce Peace. The two latter organizations labored
before and during the war for mediation of conflicts through the use of
international law and, in the case of the league, for a postwar league of na-
tions. At the same time, Schiff banked on a neutral Wilson to engineer a
status quo peace. Objecting to the craze for military preparedness in Amer-
ica, he opposed the export of munitions and funds to the belligerents.^7
Where he could, as in the case of Japan, Schiff tried at the onset of hostil-
ities to limit the scope of the war and simultaneously the number of
Germany’s enemies. Since Kuhn, Loeb held a major part of Japan’s debt, he
felt free to caution Japan against entering the war or interfering with the
balance of power by closing the open door to Chinese markets. His at-
tempt failed (and Japan joined the Allies), but his warm relationship with
that country continued, proving that his pro-German sympathies were not
absolute.^8
The Schiff papers abound with letters testifying to the public renown
that the banker and his activities had won. During the war private individ-
uals sought his support of their schemes for peace. (Salmon Levinson, a key
mover in what ultimately became the Kellogg-Briand peace pact of 1929,
was one such correspondent.) Other Americans thought to draw on Schiff’s
past experience. The executive secretary of the League to Enforce Peace,
The World at War 191