place in the public life of the country must have great courage to come out
publicly and to say that he cannot take part in this loan because he does not
want to help Russia. Regarding Jacob Schiff we can say with truth:... Few
are the Jewish millionaires who behave like Jews and with whom the honor
of the Jewish people stands higher than does the dollar.”^27
Acting on its own, Russia also approached Schiff for financial help. A
friendly and flattering Gregory Wilenkin, now openly admitting his Jewish
origins and vaguely promising assistance on the Jewish situation, surfaced
again in 1914. Schiff, equally friendly, remained adamant. He had no faith
in czarist promises, and he wanted concrete evidence of a change of heart.
If now, despite the patriotism of the Russian Jews, rumors of civil rights
proved false, Russia would forfeit any chance of cooperation.^28
Not surprised that the desired action failed to materialize, Schiff, along
with Marshall and Straus, worked determinedly to vitiate Russian efforts
for private American loans and for credits from banks within the Federal
Reserve system. For a while they even toyed with the idea of using the
issue of Jewish rights as a point of leverage with the Reading loan commis-
sion. Unsuccessful in that attempt, they resorted to publicity for influenc-
ing popular opinion and undercutting Russian machinations. Schiff, for
example, gave an emotional as well as a business reason in talks that ex-
plained his opposition: Russian banks were only tools of the “detestable
and inhuman” government and unable to cover payments on loans. He
also lobbied actively with the White House and with ranking senators
against America’s extension of financial credit to the czarist government,
but a similar plea to the Morgan firm against credits to Russia was sum-
marily dismissed.^29
On the subject of Jewish rights in Russia, Schiff trod a familiar path. He
feared neither a backlash from the Jewish or larger communities nor any
adverse effects on his image. In addition to loans, he and his circle worked
on several other Russia-related matters, such as atrocities by czarist troops
against Jews in Poland and Galicia, inhumane treatment of prisoners of
war in Siberia, and the possibility of a new commercial treaty between the
Russian and American governments. Determined that a treaty not repeat
the inequities of the 1832 accord, the AJC called the attention of the presi-
dent, the ambassador to Russia, and the influential Chamber of Commerce
to assurances of Jewish equality in the party platforms of 1912. Schiff re-
minded Wilson of his indignation at Russian discrimination and the sup-
port he had lent to abrogation in 1911. How would it look, therefore, for
the administration to disregard the passport question in negotiations for a
new treaty?^30 Unlike the abrogation campaign, a quiet approach rather
than mass appeal was employed for the perceived threat. Since the ex-
pected treaty was not drawn up, the efficacy of elitist control was again
proved to the stewards.
198 Jacob H. Schiff