Schiff may have expected that his affiliation with the movement would aug-
ment his influence with both Zionist leaders and the community at large.
He was not about to stump for a Jewish state—“I ... doubt that I can bring
myself to bodily come into Zionism”—but he was prepared to gamble that
the Zionists might tailor their priorities as payment for his affiliation.
What more effective way to wean the community away from the extremist
ideas of statehood and political group rights than to join forces with the
Brandeis camp and bore from within? If, as Schiff hoped, Brandeis would
remove himself from Zionist affairs upon his appointment to the Supreme
Court, so much the better. The jurist’s less charismatic successors would be
hard put to control the rank and file as successfully.^105
The banker’s often-repeated plea for communal unity, both to strengthen
communal resources and to gain Gentile respect, clearly played a signifi-
cant part in his calculations. He was convinced that “it is most important
for our people to get together if we are to emerge from the convulsion of
the [World War] stronger and better situated than has been the case in the
decades through which our generation and that which preceded it has been
passing.” In the congress dispute he had sought a common platform on
which the opposing factions could unite. When he recognized that he and
the AJC were in the minority, he advised the committee to yield to the
Zionists and by so doing project the image of a united Jewry. Caught up in
the heated congress debate, he backtracked on what he had said to the Me-
norah Society in 1914. Now he claimed that Zionism bred only divisive-
ness. “Instead of being a unifying force [Zionism] is rapidly becoming a se-
rious disintegrant, its leaders consisting either of idealists or self-seeking
schemers who in reality have little use for Palestine, except as a phantom
with which to lead the masses.” Thus, just as the AJC had accepted a con-
gress, so would it be in the best interests of the Zionists to seek a compro-
mise with non-Zionists on Palestinian matters. Before the war, Schiff had
supported Jewish institutions in Palestine independently of the Zionists,
but for the sake of communal unity he was prepared both to negotiate a set-
tlement with the Zionists and to work with them in practical endeavors.^106
Schiff found what he considered neutral ground for allying Zionists
with non-Zionists in the platform adopted by Lucien Wolf’s National
Union for Jewish Rights in London. The union had resolved to steer clear
of Jewish nationalism, and it limited its approval of minority rights to
“communal” and “educational” autonomy. With respect to Palestine, it
substituted Palestinianism for Zionism, asking for “adequate facilities for
immigration ... and for the establishment of Jewish colonies in that coun-
try together with full political rights and such municipal privileges as may
be necessary.” In February 1916, along with a pointed criticism of Jewish
statehood, Schiff called the program to Brandeis’s attention. No matter
who controlled Palestine after the war, he said, a Jewish state would not be
The World at War 227