the purpose of strengthening religion, a Jewish center in Palestine to halt
the disintegration of Judaism but the incompatibility of nationalist goals
with patriotism.
By the fall of 1917, the dialogue between Friedman and Schiff was
broadened to include meetings of the principals with Brandeis and his lieu-
tenants on one side and Marshall and others of the AJC on the other. With
his eye on leadership, Schiff desired the support of his associates, explain-
ing to Marshall that a consensus of committee members would carry
greater weight “with those of our people whom we honestly seek to guide”
than would the opinion of an individual. The conversations and meetings
continued, but despite Marshall’s assurance that “very little difference”
separated the Zionist and “our” views—indeed American Zionist leaders
were then adopting a pragmatic economic rather than a political approach
to Palestine—Schiff’s enrollment in the movement with or without his
friends was as yet elusive.^115
At the banker’s urging the American Zionists drafted a statement to be
sent to leaders of the World Zionist Organization, clarifying the aims of the
Basel program, the national platform adopted by the first Zionist congress.
Schiff’s terms included a homeland in Palestine as a protectorate of a great
power (probably England), Hebrew as its official language, free Jewish im-
migration controlled by a chartered Jewish company, and full civil and relig-
ious rights for the Jewish and non-Jewish communities in Palestine. He also
advised that Zionist leaders like Brandeis and Mack admit publicly that
Zionism clashed with the patriotism of Western Jewry. Letters flew back
and forth as Schiff and the Zionists debated phrases and wording.
The statement finally presented failed to meet Schiff’s approval. Verbal
promises about nationalism and a state notwithstanding, the Zionists
feared that since the the masses were apprehensive about negotiations with
the “yahudim,” they were bound to feel betrayed by an official endorse-
ment of a center as opposed to a state. At the very least, the Zionists could
not permit Schiff’s objectives to be confused with theirs. The banker too
grew less tractable. He came down more forcefully on the need to empha-
size religion, and he demanded permission to air that view (i.e., his inter-
pretation in religious terms of Zionism’s raison d’être) simultaneously with
his formal affiliation.^116
Meanwhile, the Zionists grew more disenchanted about the price they
would have to pay for enrolling Schiff. Stephen Wise, for example, asked,
“Have we won Schiff to Zionism, or has Zionism been won over to the
Schiff point of view?” Concerned about communal leadership as much as
Schiff was, they knew that were they to knuckle under to his dictates and
bring their archcompetitor into the movement, their own power would be
undermined. Brandeis finally advised that the entire matter be dropped, and
no official response to Schiff was sent. Complaining of Zionist discourtesy,
The World at War 231