for the restoration of the Land of the Fathers to the children of Israel.”^125
The goal of unity was uppermost in Schiff’s mind when the AJC dis-
cussed whether and how it should respond to the declaration. The com-
mittee itself included Zionists, non-Zionists, and anti-Zionists, and until
1917 its public stance on Zionism had been one of neutrality. President
Louis Marshall, who was loath to consign Palestine to the exclusive juris-
diction of the Zionists, listed three options: the committee could ignore
the question, it could fully support the Zionist position, or it could take a
middle-of-the-road course. Since Marshall believed that as a war aim the
declaration could not be resisted, he summarily dismissed the idea of an
anti-Zionist resolution. In a heated debate that followed, Schiff at first
suggested that the committee not address the issue. “You know how much
nearer I have myself come to Zionism,” he admitted, but the matter ap-
peared so volatile that in all likelihood it would tear the committee apart.
Toward the larger goal of communal unity, he preferred to see the AJC
deal with international questions rather than with controversial matters.
Furthermore, if the Zionists agreed to a division of labor (i.e., that they
handle the question of Palestine and the committee handle the interests of
American and other Jewries) and if they agreed to cooperate with the
committee should the two areas of jursdiction overlap, “we can give to the
world the spectacle of a united Jewry whereas otherwise we will have con-
flict.” Schiff changed his mind, however, when Mack argued that ignoring
the declaration was tantamount to an abdication of leadership. Now seek-
ing a response that would neither split the committee nor compromise its
leadership, Schiff suggested a statement in sympathy with the Balfour
Declaration “which shall not however commit the Committee to a defi-
nite policy.” Cyrus Adler and Mayer Sulzberger, doubtless recalling how
committee leaders had been burned by the Zionists in the congress epi-
sode, initially opposed any expression of approval, but Schiff’s weak reso-
lution was adopted unanimously.^126
The banker contributed to the drafting of the statement, which was
then cleared with Secretary of State Lansing. At best a bland compromise,
it disappointed Zionists like Mack. Schiff himself heartily but privately
endorsed Mack’s call for a national homeland rather than a center in Pales-
tine, but in the interest of unity he did not attempt to foist his new feelings
about Zionism on his non- or anti-Zionist colleagues. In its statement the
AJC said that it appreciated the Balfour Declaration and that it would
cooperate with those who sought “a center for Judaism” in Palestine. But it
talked of “a” center, not “the” center; a center for Judaism, not a political
state; and it underscored the loyalty of Jews to the lands in which they
lived. Schiff and Marshall steered the AJC thereby on a path of non-
Zionism, one that preserved unity within the organization while it permit-
ted greatest latitude on Palestinian affairs.^127
The World at War 235