gathered testimony from sympathetic Russians, like the former Russian
envoy, Boris Bakhmetev, contradicting the charge, but such denials were
useless in the face of the big lie. Equally ineffective in the larger picture was
Marshall’s time-consuming practice of handling slanderers individually.^14
Bereft of viable options, the AJC somewhat reluctantly considered using
Sack, the agent of the Whites, and the Russian Information Bureau.
Fully aware of the atrocities perpetrated by Kolchak’s army, the Jewish
stewards nonetheless gave Sack a hearing. Since it was in the latter’s inter-
est to incite opposition to the Reds, he enthusiastically urged the commit-
tee to bold action contradicting the Bolshevik image. He even suggested,
albeit unrealistically, that American Jews intervene in Russia for the resto-
ration of order. He reasoned too that if they aided non-Jewish Russians in
the American army or sent relief to non-Jews in Russia, the latter would
become more friendly to Jews and thereby weaken the identification of
Jews with Bolshevism. Schiff, who corresponded regularly with Sack until a
few months before his death, made several financial contributions to the
Russian Information Bureau and was given the title of “honorary adviser.”
Doubtless the purpose of his contributions was to ensure that the articles
disseminated by Sack, if not by his sponsors, were favorably disposed to-
ward Russian Jews. To be sure, cooperation with Kolchak’s agent could fur-
ther infuriate the Reds, but it might perhaps protect Jews from the Whites
and undermine the charge of Jew=Bolshevik.^15
American Jews were thrust into the anti-Bolshevik spotlight in 1919,
when Methodist minister George Simons testified before a Senate sub-
committee on Bolshevik propaganda. Simons, who had served in Russia,
talked seriously about a connection between Russian Jewish Bolshevik
leaders and American Jews of New York’s Lower East Side. He also
charged that nineteen out of twenty Bolshevik propagandists in the United
States were Jews. “I have no doubt in my mind,” he added, “that the pre-
dominant element of the Bolsheviki movement in America is... the Yid-
dish [sic] of the East Side.” Although in this case Simons exempted the
“better class” of Jews, the stewards were infuriated, particularly since the
subcommittee was favorably impressed by him. Schiff termed the “so-
called testimony” outrageous and libelous, and Marshall offered a detailed
rebuttal, along with a statement showing the incompatibility of Judaism
and Bolshevism. Neither man denied that some Jews, but only a small num-
ber—Schiff called them “black sheep” that could be found among any peo-
ple—favored the Communist experiment.^16
The Red Scare of 1919–20, to which the Simons episode belonged,
faded rapidly. Its anti-Semitic component, however, lived on and gained
widespread public acceptance, largely through the publication and popu-
larity of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion and the rantings of Henry Ford’s
Dearborn Independent. The auto king hammered away at the “international
244 Jacob H. Schiff