A Study in American Jewish Leadership

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Schiff believed that for sheer survival the Union Pacific needed to own
the Burlington^46 or at least to prevent it from being swallowed by Hill. He
and Harriman conferred with the directors of the road with an eye toward
purchase, but the talks collapsed in the spring of 1900. An alternative tac-
tic—control of the Burlington by a concerted purchase of its stock— was
adopted, but that too failed. The story continues in a lengthy letter from
Schiff to Cassel:


Early in February [1900] it became evident that somebody [else] was buying
Burlington stock quite largely, and it was then said that the Great Northern
and Northern Pacific people... had, upon Mr. Hill’s instigation, set about to
get control of the Burlington; evidently for no other purpose than aggrand-
izement. When this situation developed, I, with others of the Union Pacific
people, went to Mr. Hill and asked him whether the reports were true... to
which he replied that these reports were utterly unfounded, as he had no di-
rect or indirect interests in Burlington.^47

The Schiff group soon realized that Hill had lied, that he was in fact a
serious competitor for the Burlington, and they sought him out again. He
now said that he regretted having misled Schiff, but aware of his former
friend’s concern for the Union Pacific, he feared that the banker would
interfere in his plans. Harriman’s forces stood firm. They warned that they
would not let the Burlington fall into rival hands that “could, and in time
would, use it to sap the life out of the Union Pacific.” “[Hill] answered
with platitudes,” Schiff told Cassel, “and we thereupon turned to Mor-
gans.”^48 The Morgan bankers dismissed the Union Pacific’s offer to partic-
ipate in the acquisition of the Burlington, and the road went to Hill.
Thereupon the Harriman-Schiff camp plotted aggressive strategy.
They would gain control of the Burlington by secretly buying its new
owner, the Northern Pacific. The move was hailed in retrospect for its
courage and boldness. In Schiff’s words, “we... cleared the deck for [dras-
tic] action, and went about to accumulate sufficient Northern Pacific stock
to control the Company.... We succeeded, in the course of some weeks in
accumulating about forty per cent of the total capital stock of the Northern
Pacific Company.” According to the Hill group, Schiff’s confidence was
misplaced. They argued that what ultimately mattered was not the total
capital stock but the common stock, of which the Schiff-Harriman forces had
but a minority.^49
Hill had deceived his rivals, and they felt justified in surprising him. Not
only were Harriman and Schiff out to best Hill and Morgan, but the
Rockefeller–City Bank interests, also supporters of Harriman, had their
own scores to settle with the formidable Morgan. A major battle seemed
imminent. Schiff, a man who usually shrank from confrontation, especially


16 Jacob H. Schiff

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