ing the president. Indeed, his letters about Roosevelt’s action usually con-
tained expressions of confidence in TR’s sagacity and his sincere concern
for the nation’s economic welfare. The tone may have jarred with Schiff’s
warnings about the government’s legal action, but the banker could not
have afforded to do otherwise. At the very same time that the case was
pending, 1902–1904, Schiff was pleading with Roosevelt for official con-
demnation of anti-Jewish persecution in Romania and Russia (see below).
Unlike Morgan, who usually kept his distance from politicians, the Jewish
banker needed to cultivate allies in government for the sake of fellow Jews
in Europe. As a businessman he could disagree with TR’s trustbusting, but
as a Jewish leader he didn’t have the luxury of damning Roosevelt publicly.
The president willingly accepted Schiff on those terms and consulted him
on various economic issues. He did not seek out the company of “the big-
moneyed men in New York,” but he respected their power.^61 Moreover, in
Roosevelt’s political calculations, Schiff could and did prove to be a valu-
able asset in attracting the Jewish vote.
The Supreme Court’s decision in 1904 upheld the government’s charges
and outlawed the Northern Securities Company.^62 (Both the Hill and Har-
riman sides disagreed on the disposition of the company’s stock. Since
Schiff was the only one to suggest that that the two parties settle the dis-
pute themselves, the issue was finally resolved by a court order.)^63 Although
the highest court’s ruling boosted Roosevelt’s popularity, it did little to
change the northwestern railroad situation or to restore competition.
Schiff had expected an adverse court opinion, but he confidently believed
that Hill, one of the “ablest railroad men this generation has produced,”
would find a way to preserve the unified management of the separate lines.
Once the decision was reached, the banker kept his gloomy forecasts on its
harmful effects to himself. In one interview he found something about the
ruling to praise. He explained that it would prevent the formation of other
combinations that in turn would lead to more stringent legislation by the
federal government and the states.^64
The Roosevelt administration wasn’t done with the Union Pacific.
With the president’s blessing the Interstate Commerce Commission
(ICC) began an investigation of Harriman’s railroads and the holdings of
the Union Pacific early in 1907. Enemies of Harriman, called by his biog-
rapher the “Harriman Extermination League,” looked to TR to lead a
campaign that would destroy the railroad magnate. Compounding the
charges against Harriman’s “pirate-like” activities in the past was the pri-
vate dispute between him and Roosevelt. Harriman claimed that an
“understanding” with the president, relating to an entirely different sub-
ject, had been reached after the railroad man contributed to Republican
coffers in the 1904 election. When he charged that Roosevelt had not lived
up to the agreement, friendly relations between the two were broken off. A
The Making of a Leader 21