group increasingly wearied of the China affair. The frustrated American
bankers began to talk seriously in 1910 of dissolving the group. At a crucial
meeting on September 1, opinion divided. Schiff and Henry Davison of
Morgan argued against dissolution, and only strong appeals to patriotism
by Davison and the State Department kept the group alive. In the last days
of the Taft administration, Kuhn, Loeb reversed its stand and told Morgan
that it was “unbusinesslike” for the group to continue. Schiff believed that
negotiations weren’t going anywhere and that Chinese business had be-
come a “bottomless pit.” Others agreed, and when Woodrow Wilson repu-
diated dollar diplomacy as soon as he took office in 1913, the group was ef-
fectively dissolved. The Chinese affair had profited neither the bankers nor
the government, and the group’s efforts had succeeded mainly in evoking
European antagonism.^111
Schiff reached the pinnacle of his career in the decade before World War I.
Neither his power nor that of Kuhn, Loeb suffered lasting damage because
of official investigations and hearings. His weak showing at the Equitable
hearings was more than canceled out by his role that same year in the
Russo-Japanese War. Simultaneously, he was expending countless hours on
philanthropy and on the defense of his fellow Jews, activities that spread his
fame throughout the world. His ability to engage in communal affairs at
the same time that he ran an active business—in effect two fulltime posi-
tions—testified to his energy and to his skills as a meticulous organizer and
able administrator.
The banker enjoyed his work. Adhering to a rigorous self-imposed reg-
imen—it was said that he answered every piece of mail—he continued to
drive himself even after the age of retirement. His business acuity and
judgment earned wide respect. European bankers who worked with Kuhn,
Loeb attested to his courage and his “unusual grasp of problems.” One said
that “he often rushed in where others feared to tread [but he] almost never
made a mistake in business judgment.” A writer for a popular magazine
meant it as a compliment when he said that Schiff had “the mind of his
race, which is essentially a realistic mind.”^112
Those who had dealings with Schiff saw various facets of his character.
His co-workers at Kuhn, Loeb knew him to be serious, formal, if not strait-
laced, and a highly self-disciplined employer who held them to high stan-
dards. Clients commented on his legendary self-confidence in business
dealings. (A director of the Pennsylvania Railroad recounted how Schiff
would listen to a discussion and then say: “I have had a long experience,
and I have come to this conclusion, and I think it is right!” And that, the
railroad man said, generally ended the matter.)^113 Friends praised his hu-
manitarianism, but they saw in addition his obstinacy and quick temper.
The Making of a Leader 39