between leaders and constituents, and accountability. They alone were re-
sponsible for what amounted to Jewish public policy. To be sure, elitist
leadership could not be absolute in a democratic America. Despite secret
planning sessions, leaders did communicate with their constituents
through public speeches and through the columns of a watchful press. But
generally, the undemocratic methods went unchallenged.
Control by the stewards was eminently palatable to the German-
American Jews at the end of the century. Despite local and regional differ-
ences, the Germans were essentially a homogeneous group that shared
Schiff’s emphasis on Jewish integration into American society. Within the
expanding eastern European immigrant community the centrist elements
also looked to the German leaders as models to be emulated. The new-
comers, particularly labor leaders and Yiddish journalists, occasionally
chafed under elitist control, but at the same time they expected and desired
the establishment’s protection. Over both camps the stewards wielded
what has been described as “the authority of confidence.”^7
Schiff too recognized communal restraints on the leader. Secure in his
own decisions, he was, however, well aware that even elitist leadership de-
pended at bottom on the support it commanded from the rank and file.
Only a leader with an impressive following could set policy for the commu-
nity and, equally important, ask favors of Gentile power brokers for that
community. Although his style frequently resembled that of the premod-
ern “court Jew,” Schiff objected to the label Hofjudeand its connotation of
irresponsible action or neglect of group interests. He stated publicly: “I am
by no means so narrow as to believe, because a man expends part of his
means for public or philanthropic purposes, that he owes responsibility to
no one but himself.”^8 In practice, however, responsibility meant that he
acted for the good of the community as he interpreted it without sharing
plans or strategy with more than a small number of friends.
The banker and his close allies firmly believed in the leader’s need of
Jewish credentials. Orthodox religious observance and a Jewish education
were not essential, but communal service and some sort of religious faith
were. When Schiff recommended Marshall to the Supreme Court in 1909,
his praise for his friend, “the highest and best type” of Jew, meant the
proper credentials. On the same grounds, Schiff and Marshall withheld
their approval when Woodrow Wilson, looking for a Jew in his administra-
tion, considered the appointment of Louis Brandeis to the cabinet (1913).
One critic of Brandeis called the Jewish attorney an agent of Schiff(!), but
the latter let it be known that he did not consider Brandeis to be a “repre-
sentative Jew.” The argument was no longer relevant four years later in
connection with Brandeis’s appointment to the Supreme Court. Although
Brandeis had included Kuhn, Loeb in his attack on the money trust, he had
nevertheless won national recognition as the leader of American Zionists.^9
44 Jacob H. Schiff