Microsoft Word - 00_Title_draft.doc

(Chris Devlin) #1
The score of this variable is augmented by 1 point in case escape clauses are foreseen and clearly specified.
Criterion 5: Media visibility of the rule
The score of this criterion index is calculated as follows:
3 is assigned if the rule observance is closely monitored by the media, and if non-compliance is likely to
trigger a public debate
2 for high media interest in rule-compliance, but non-compliance is unlikely to invoke a public debate
1 for no or modest interest of the media
In absence of strong theoretical base or preference regarding the weight to be given to each criterion, it was
decided to calculate the synthetic index in a large number of different ways, reflecting different possible
weightings for the five criteria. The scores of the five criteria were first standardised to run between 0 and 1.
Then, a random weights technique was used following the method used by Sutherland and al. (2005). This
technique uses 10000 sets of randomly-generated weights to calculate the synthetic indicator in 10000 different
ways. The random weights are drawn from a uniform distribution between zero and one and then normalised to
sum to one. The resulting distribution for the synthetic indicator reflects the possible range of values given no a
priori information on the weight to be given to each component of the index. Given that the weights are drawn
from a uniform distribution, the mean value of the synthetic indicator is asymptotically equivalent to the
indicator calculated using equal weights for the constituent components (unweighted arithmetic average). The
chart below shows, for all the fiscal rules considered in the study, the range containing 98% of the values of the
index of strength of the rule calculated with 10000 different sets of random weights (we eliminated the 1%
lowest and highest values of the synthetic index)
Figure 11 - Index of strength of the fiscal rules in force in EU Member States in 2005
(classified according to the average value)

0,3

0,4

0,5

0,6

0,7

0,8

0,9

1

1,1

HUN-DR-LGBE-RR-CGPT-BBR-CGFR-ER-CGFIN-ER-CGLV-RR-CGSSPT-BBR-LGSL-DR-GGFIN-BBR-CGLUX-ER-CGLUX-DR-CGLV-DR-LGIE-BBR-LGDK-BBR-GGDE-BBR-RGBE-BBR-SSLT-DR-CGSK-DR-RGLGDE-ER-CGRGIT-BBR-LGFR-BBR-LGIT-ER-CGRGFIN-DR-CG

AT-BBR-
SW-BBR-GGDE-BBR-CG

SP-DR-LGBE-BBR-LGNL-ER-GGNL-RR-GGSP-DR-RGIT-ER-LGRGCZ-ER-CGSP-DR-RGIE-ER-CGFIN-RR-SSDK-RR-GGDE-BBR-LG
CZ-DR-LGRG

BE-ER-CGEE-DR-LGSP-BBR-GGLUX-BBR-SSFIN-BBR-LGLT-BBR-LGDK-ER-GGFR-RR-CGFR-ER-SSSK-ER-CGDE-DR-LGIT-BBR-RGSL-DR-LGBE-BBR-RGIE-ER-CGBE-ER-SSUK-BBR-GGPL-DR-GG

SW-ER-
UK-DR-GGEE-BBR-GG

Notes:
1/ The chart shows, for all the numerical fiscal rules considered in the study, the range containing 98% of the values of the index of strength of the
fiscal rule concerned. Rules were classified in an ascending order. The scores of the individual criteria taken into account in the calculation of the
overall index were normalised to one. The size of the vertical line provides an indication of the heterogeneity of the scores related to the five criteria
considered in the calculation of the synthetic index.
2/ When the characteristics of a rule have evolved over time, the chart only present the index consistent with the most recent features. Three rules
presented in the chart are not anymore in force in 2005. For Belgium, the expenditure rule and the revenue rule were implemented for the
convergence process leading to EMU qualification. For Slovenia, the debt rule was in force over 2000-2004.

A country-specific 'fiscal rule index', taking into account the coverage and the characteristics of
numerical fiscal rules


By combining the information contained in the 'fiscal rule coverage index' and the information of the
strength of each fiscal rule, a time-varying 'fiscal rule index' was constructed, for each Member State,

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