48 Britain TheEconomistFebruary12th 2022
Time for reinforcements
Britain, share of Londoners agreeing , %
Source:MPSPublicAttitudeSurvey
90
80
70
60
50
40
212019181716152014
The police do a good job in the local area
The police treat everybody fairly
rard (see chart). But that is only one aspect
of a growing confidence problem. Over the
past five years Londoners have become less
convinced that the police do a good job lo
cally. The share of crime victims who are
satisfied with their treatment has slid, too.
A combination of austerity and chang
ing strategy is probably to blame, says An
dy Higgins of the Police Foundation, a
thinktank. Police in London (and else
where) have focused more on investigating
domestic violence, child abuse and cyber
crime, and less on solving neighbourhood
problems. They are less visible. The num
ber of Police Community Support Officers,
who walk the streets but cannot use force,
has fallen by half since 2012. To save mon
ey, in 2018 the Met reorganised itself, going
from 32 boroughcommandunitstojust 12
“basic command units”. That seems to
have distanced officersfromthepublic:
the larger bcus covermoreciviliansthan
some county police forces. The recent
scandals are allthemore damaging be
cause Londonershavefewergoodexperi
ences of policingtosetthemagainst.
The Met’s political adventures have
rubbished its reputation further. After
weeks of refusingtoinvestigatereportsof
parties in and aroundDowningStreetdur
ing covid19 lockdowns,inJanuaryitsud
denly announcedreversedcourse.Italso
insisted that a fullreportintothepartiesby
Sue Gray, a civilservant,notbepublished
until its inquiries wereover. mps com
plained of a “stitchup”andsaidtheMet
was “usurping [Parliament’s]position”.But
its inquiry has alsoshieldedtheforceit
self. The governmentcannotmeddlewith
the coppers whoareinvestigatingit.
It is not certainwhocanpushtheMet
around. Dame Cressidaanswersto both
the mayor of Londonandthehomesecre
tary. “It’s not clearwhothedominantboss
is,” says Tim Newburn,a policewatcherat
the London SchoolofEconomics.Bothpol
iticians—one Labour,theotherConserva
tive—have let it beknownthattheydespair
of the force. Neitherseemsable,orwilling,
to do much to fixit.n
NorthernIrishpolitics
Dashedpromises
B ELFAST
Candevolutionintheprovincesurvive
thelatestcollapse?
N
orthern ireland’smost famous ex
ports include Rory McIlroy, George
Best, Van Morrison—and peace. Since the
Good Friday Agreement of 1998, it has been
marketed around the world as a template
for ending seemingly intractable political
violence. And if peace is defined as the ab
sence of violence, it has been remarkably
successful. An average of 124 deaths from
political violence every year during the
three decades of “the troubles” fell to just
eight a year in the two decades since. But
sectarian divisions remain bitter and the
centrepiece of the deal, a powersharing
government involving almost every shade
of political opinion, has failed.
Since the devolved administration was
set up in 1999, it has been absent for 37% of
the time. Now it is absent again. On Febru
ary 3rd Sir Jeffrey Donaldson (pictured)
pulled his party’s first minister out of gov
ernment, collapsing the administration.
Sir Jeffrey, leader of the Democratic Union
ist Party (dup), the main party supporting
Northern Ireland’s status within the Unit
ed Kingdom, said the move was in protest
at the Northern Ireland protocol, the part
of the Brexit deal that prevents an Irish
land border by creating a customs border
between the province and Great Britain.
The dup had initially, albeit reluctantly,
accepted the protocol. Its voters, however,
are less keen. An election to the devolved
government looms in May, and a recent
poll put support among unionists for the
protocol in its current form at just 2%. The
day before the dup walked out, one of its
ministers ordered civil servants to stop
some of the border checks. They refused,
fearing that the order was illegal. A court
injunction then suspended the order until
a full hearing next month.
In the early years of the devolved ad
ministration, whenever it collapsed the
British government would appoint its own
ministers to run government departments.
But in 2017, when a scandal relating to bun
gled green incentives brought the admin
istration down, local civil servants were
given the job instead. The results were
messy. They kept most government servic
es functioning day to day. But untaken
strategic decisions piled up.
Eventually, public anger over a nurses’
strike together with poor election results
for both Sinn Fein, the biggest of the par
ties that seeks a united Ireland, and the
dupforced the two parties to govern to
gether again from January 2020. But then
the pandemic exposed their ability to find
rancour in the unlikeliest areas. The Sinn
Fein deputy first minister went on televi
sion to denounce the unionist health min
ister’s plans. Senior dup figures blocked
pandemic restrictions by using a veto
meant to protect Protestants or Catholics
from discrimination.
Many within Stormont, home of the de
volved administration, believe that the lat
est collapse is terminal. That is probably
exaggerated. For the dup and Sinn Fein the
alternatives—direct rule from London or
no government at all—are less palatable
than having some power themselves.
But there may well be another pro
longed period without a devolved govern
ment. Sinn Fein is expected to emerge
from the elections in May as Northern Ire
land’s largest party for the first time, and
many in the dup say they will refuse to en
ter the executive as junior partner with
Sinn Fein, which was formed as the politi
cal wing of the ira. Moreover, the dup has
said its veto on devolution will end only if
the Irish Sea border is removed. But talks
with the eu will at most reduce the border’s
impact, and even if the British government
were to override the protocol unilaterally,
as Boris Johnson again hinted on February
9th, Sinn Fein would then probably wield
its veto instead.
And all the while paramilitary groups
continue to act in the shadows. Indeed,
their clout seems to be growing. Six days
before Sir Jeffrey brought down Stormont,
he met loyalist paramilitary representa
tives, and was reportedly told to collapse
devolution. In 1983, when republican gun
men burst into a Protestant church and
murdered three elders, or in 1994, when
loyalist gunmen murdered six pubgoers as
they watched a football match, the pros
pect of paramilitaries restricting them
selves to political lobbying would have
seemed heavenly. But in 1998, Northern
Ireland was promised so much more.n