8 Leaders The Economist February 12th 2022
N
othing concentratesmindslike130,000troopspoisedto
invade. For years relations between Russia and the West
have languished, but the Russian forces converging on Ukraine
have caused a spasm of diplomacy. On February 7th and 8th Em
manuel Macron, France’s president, went to Moscow and
Kyiv with plans to prevent war. He was to be followed east by the
British ministers of foreign affairs and defence. Next week will
be the turn of Olaf Scholz, Germany’s chancellor.
All face two sets of Russian demands. One is to recast Eu
rope’s security architecture by constraining natoin the east.
The other is to lock Ukraine in Russia’s orbit. Of the two, Ukraine
is more urgent and perilous. The danger is that in seeking to
avoid an invasion, the West lumbers Ukraine with a deal that
leads to internal chaos, or even civil strife.
The fulcrum is Donbas, where Russian
backed separatists have been at war with the
rest of Ukraine since 2014. The Minsk II agree
ment, signed in 2015, including by a Ukrainian
negotiator, was supposed to stop the fighting,
but much of it has never been implemented.
Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, wants the
West to force the Ukrainian government to
comply. Mr Macron and Mr Scholz, backed by the Biden admin
istration, see Minsk as an opportunity.
The Ukrainians sense a trap, and they are right to be worried
(see International section). Minsk is not a treaty so much as a
sketch scrawled on the back of an envelope. In fewer than
words in its English version, it deals mostly with the ceasefire,
dodging hard questions about what comes later. It declares that
the renegade regions have a “special” status, without defining
what that is. It says there will be elections, but not who can stand
or vote. Unspecified “representatives” will help write a new con
stitution. Which side must do what and when?
Vagueness suited Mr Putin, who all along saw Minsk as a tool
to manipulate Ukraine. The special status is sometimes taken to
meanthattheDonbasregionshouldhave a veto over foreign
policy, including membership of nato. Mr Putin has backed
elections there that excluded most of those sympathetic to the
government in Kyiv. He has issued hundreds of thousands of
Russian passports and controls perhaps 40,000 local troops,
whose leaders he wants to help write the new constitution. His
version of Minsk is a Trojan horse that would either put Ukraine
under Russian control or foment chaos.
For all those reasons many Ukrainians see Minsk as utterly
unacceptable. Yet its very vagueness creates a diplomatic open
ing, which Volodymyr Zelensky, Ukraine’s beleaguered presi
dent, could exploit in order to take back the initiative. Mr Putin’s
is just one of many possible interpretations of Minsk. Talks in
volving France, Germany, Ukraine and Russia
could put flesh on the agreement so as to limit
the special status of Donbas, ensure fairer vot
ing and make sure that delegates from Donbas
to a constitutional convention are properly
elected, not simply appointed by the Kremlin.
After the agreement, Western powers could
support Ukraine politically, economically and
diplomatically.
Would Mr Putin agree to that? Perhaps not. In any case the
West should not force a deal on Ukraine. That would abrogate
Ukrainian sovereignty and destabilise the whole country, with
unpredictable consequences that could spill back into the Euro
pean Union.
Mr Putin must weigh the odds, too. Talks over Ukraine, fol
lowed by more talks with natoon, say, arms control, could ease
tensions and give him some of what he wants. He could tell Rus
sians he is a statesman who has avoided being goaded into war
by the West. By contrast, refusing to talk would leave him no tool
except an unpredictable, long and (for Russia) possibly ruinous
war. Mr Putin has kept people guessing as to what he really
wants. Talks over Minsk are the best and safest way to find out.n
Shuttle diplomacy has created an opening for detente, but beware a trap
Minsky moment
The Ukraine crisis
S
ince 2016 the value of investments in financial products that
claim to abide by environmental, social and governance (esg)
rules has grown from $23trn to $35trn. Bloomberg Intelligence, a
research firm, reckons it could exceed $50trn by 2025. esgfunds
typically tell their customers that, among other things, they do
their bit to tackle climate change when they invest in publicly
listed companies. Most individual investors take these claims
seriously and buy these funds in good faith.
Such faith is not always wellplaced. A lack of rigorous mea
surement means that greenwashing is rife and bogus claims go
uncontested. Many funds claim that there is no tradeoff be
tween maximising profits and green investing, which seems un
likely for as long as the externalities created by polluting firms
are legal and untaxed. And esg funds often seek to meet their
goals simply by excluding the shares of firms in polluting indus
tries from their portfolios, and piling instead into pricey tech
stocks, from Alphabet to Zoom.
As we report this week, the rise of esg investing and the stig
ma faced by publicly listed energy firms is having an unintended
sideeffect (see Finance & economics section). The Western
world’s dirty assets are heading into the shadows. Public firms,
including European oil majors such as Shell, and large listed
Polluting assets are heading into the financial shadows
A dirty secret
Green investing