The Sunday Times February 13, 2022 3
6 Deloitte is being probed by
the FRC over its audits of
Lookers. The watchdog looked
into the car dealership’s 2017
and 2018 accounts last year,
after Lookers said it had
discovered potentially
fraudulent transactions at one of its units while preparing its 2019
accounts. After an investigation, Lookers said it had found that pre-tax
profits had been overstated by £25.5 million. The FRC has not released
any details. Deloitte resigned as auditor of the company in 2020 after 14
years overseeing its accounts.
Deloitte is also under investigation over its auditing of Essar Oil UK
and was previously fined a record £15 million for serious misconduct in
its audit of software group Autonomy. It has also faced investigations
over audits of UK outsourcer Mitie and building materials company SIG.
Deloitte declined to comment.
6 EY is grappling with the fallout from
the collapse of German payments firm
Wirecard, which it audited for a decade.
It has become the country’s biggest
post-war accounting scandal. Former
chief executive Markus Braun was
arrested on suspicion of
accounting fraud before the
company fell into
insolvency. He has denied
wrongdoing. Several EY
Germany partners are under
investigation by prosecutors
and the country’s audit
watchdog, and the firm is
expected to face claims of
€1 billion from
investors. EY chief executive Carmine Di
Sibio said in September it would invest
$2 billion (£1.5 billion) in the next three
years to improve the quality of its audits
EY has faced scrutiny over its audits
of failed FTSE 100 hospital operator
NMC Health, and was fined £2.2 million
by the FRC last year for its audit of
Stagecoach. It is also, along with
PwC, being probed over its audit
of London Capital & Finance, the
collapsed minibond company.
EY said it was co-operating
with the FRC’s Inquiries and it
would be inappropriate to
comment.
EY
6 Outsourcer Carillion — which was
audited by KPMG — was working on
about 450 public sector projects
when it went bust in 2018 under
£7 billion of debt. KPMG’s UK chief
executive, Jon Holt, last month
admitted that its auditors had
“misled” regulators during
inspections of audits of
Carillion and fellow outsourcer
Regenersis. The FRC has
accused KPMG and six of its
former employees who audited
the two outsourcers of forging
documents and misleading its
inspectors; there is an industry
tribunal into the allegations, and
an investigation into KPMG’s audits of
Carillion. This month, Carillion’s
liquidators made a £1.3 billion legal
claim against KPMG, saying it missed
“red flags” in its audits of the company.
KPMG, chaired by Bina Mehta, left, has
said it believes the lawsuit is without
merit and will defend it robustly.
KPMG was fined £13.5 million last
year after one of its partners helped
push bed maker Silentnight
towards insolvency so HIG, a
private equity group, could
acquire it without its pension
liabilities.
Holt said: “We will deal with ... and
learn from these legacy issues.”
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an order themselves. That’s not to forget
the time and travel savings for
consumers who could purchase goods
and have them delivered without leaving
their armchairs.
So what the heck were we going to do?
1: Suppliers wouldn’t like the fact that
online dealers didn’t want to commit
until they had an order. We vowed to go
the other way — what we called “narrow
and deep”. We would specialise in
committing to ordering big quantities of
a small number of lines, but we wanted
better prices in return so we could
compete and survive.
2: Retailers traditionally had higher
costs, the biggest being their properties.
Thankfully, I had always gone for sites in
much cheaper secondary locations that
we could, over time, afford to buy
outright (and to this day we own the
freeholds on more than 90 per cent of
our sites, so don’t have to pay rent). We
figured that our products are a
I
had a problem. It was the late 1990s
and things weren’t looking good.
Retail was under attack with the
arrival of the internet and you could
read the writing on the wall. I
remember walking with my wife on
the beautiful beach at Filey in North
Yorkshire, discussing the serious
possibility that shopkeepers selling
commodity products could go the way of
the brontosaurus if we weren’t careful.
When the first search engines started,
you could type in the model you wanted
— be it a camera, telly or anything else
with a number — and they would churn
out the cheapest price for you. This
included goods from non-authorised
retailers that couldn’t provide back-up,
cowboys selling fake products, items
being advertised that didn’t exist and
people trading from their front rooms —
none of which the great British public
realised. It was the Wild West and it was
already causing us problems.
One advantage of the web was that
sellers could show infinite ranges
(whereas us shopkeepers had to pay for
the stock, ship it, display it nicely in
expensive stores, pay sales staff to
provide service etc). But, these new-
fangled sellers were at great risk because
if a competitor dropped their price by a
penny, they would no longer be top of
the search engine’s recommendations
and would be stuffed. They couldn’t sell
their wares unless they dropped their
price, too. Quickly, the profit in the
product would be eroded and it would
be a zero-sum game with no winners
among the sellers. So we had to figure
out a way to survive in this environment.
The web’s other advantages were that
it offered immediate pricing visibility for
shoppers and competitive downwards
pressure on prices that should benefit
consumers if it could get its act together.
Sellers could advertise online, then buy
from their supplier only when they got
4: Service online would be limited to
text, photos and, ultimately, film
footage; more expensive and complex
items would still benefit from live
interaction with knowledgeable people.
So we decided to move into more
specialist products such as projectors,
higher-end hi-fi and more sophisticated
TVs. We thought customers would
appreciate the great service that we tried
to give. Suppliers loved this, too; they
made no money from a £99 telly.
5: If we could develop niche products or
our own exclusive lines that weren’t sold
on the web, we wouldn’t have to
compete with the whole world. We could
focus on value (which I define as “quality
per pound”) by cutting out the
distributor in the middle to reduce
prices — and benefit from the product
reviews this would generate.
6: We needed to convince
manufacturers that if they didn’t regard
retail as a distribution channel worth
“considered” purchase, unlike an apple
or a newspaper, so customers would be
prepared to travel to us. In other words,
we were a destination.
3: Costs were key when competing with
the web, and we were very careful about
opening more stores that we might not
need as the web began to have an impact
on retail — a point not heeded by some
other retailers, which suffered
accordingly.
I dodged the online retail asteroid – and you can, too
I had thought that
shops selling
commodities
faced extinction
Julian Richer Sound Advice
GERARDO JACONELLI
saving, we would all go out of business,
as indeed many did — Comet, Best Buy,
Maplin and lots of independent
electronics retailers. But it took me ten
years to do this. I had to have several
conversations with suppliers along the
lines of, “Can you please come and
collect your products before it rains, as
your stock is outside on the pavement?”
When they asked what I meant, I’d reply:
“I mean that unless I can compete with
the web and make a margin to cover my
costs, I don’t want your product!” They
got the message in the end.
These measures saved us, and I am
here to tell the tale.
The moral of this story is that
businesses evolve all the time and if you
don’t go forwards, you go backwards. As
this example shows, asteroids can
sometimes be avoided if you spot them
early enough.
Julian Richer is founder and managing
director of Richer Sounds
Noel Edmonds hosted the
first-ever National Lottery
show on BBC1 in November
1994, with seven people
sharing a jackpot of
£5.8 million. Its operator,
Camelot, had beaten seven
other bidders to take on the
lucrative contract and has
since created 6,300
millionaires and handed out
£56 billion in prize money.
Today, a competition to
select an operator to run the
lottery for its fourth licence
term has erupted into a fierce
fight for control — one that
has been mired in claims of
incompetence, leaks and an
unfair scoring system.
The contest burst into the
open last week with reports
that Camelot, the incumbent,
had scored highest in an early
assessment of four bidders.
The Gambling Commission
insisted it had yet to make a
decision, but the leak has led
to criticism of the regulator,
which is responsible for
choosing a winner.
Julian Knight, chairman of
the Commons DCMS select
committee, which is leading
an inquiry into the
competition, said the leak
was “unfortunate and
incompetent”. It was also met
with dismay that Camelot
looked poised to secure the
contract for a fourth term.
Camelot, which is owned
by the Ontario Teachers’
Pension Plan, has been
criticised for growing sales
from games other than the
traditional weekly draws,
such as scratch cards.
A lower proportion of
scratch card sales is given to
good causes compared
with draws.
“There have been
concerns ... raised
to the committee
that Camelot have
gamed the system, by
effectively using the
parameters of the
licence to grow their own
revenue streams. But at the
same time, that’s not
benefiting good causes as
you’d like,” said Knight.
Camelot gave 28 per cent
of its revenues to good causes
in 2010, but that proportion
fell to less than 23 per cent in
its most recent accounts.
The company said it has
increased the total figure, due
to a rise in revenues from
£5.5 billion to £8.4 billion a
year.
Carolyn Harris,
chairwoman of the all-party
parliamentary group on
gambling-related harm, said
she had “grave concerns”
Rows erupt as Camelot
closes in on Lottery jackpot
transparently” identify the
best application. “The
commission is proud that its
process has attracted a range
of applicants and a vigorous
competitive process,” it said.
However, even after being
scored on the extensive list of
factors, a quirk in the process
means that bidders can then
be marked down if they are
deemed to be ‘higher risk’. A
so-called solution risk factor,
which critics say is vague and
subjective, can wipe up to
15 per cent from the score
related to the bidders’
business plan. A 15 per cent
penalty could easily result in
failing the competition.
While the potential scores
have not yet been made
public, industry sources
claim that Camelot, as the
incumbent, has an unfair
advantage from this process.
A new operator without
Camelot’s track record in the
UK would inevitably be seen
as more risky, they said.
The commission said the
evaluation process was
“highly confidential”. “The
outcome report has yet to be
finalised,” it said. “Our job is
to run the best competition
we possibly can — one that is
fair and open and results in
the best outcome for players
and good causes.”
The fight for the National
Lottery involves some of the
UK’s leading names in politics
and business. Allwyn, owned
by the Czech oligarch Karel
Komarek, has enlisted former
Sainsbury’s chief executive
Justin King to spearhead its
bid. Sisal, an Italian lottery
operator, has hired Baroness
(Karren) Brady and Lord
(Ed) Vaizey, former
culture minister, to
advise.
Richard Desmond’s
Northern & Shell,
which already owns the
Health Lottery, has not
gone public with its
advisers. Camelot is
chaired by Sir Hugh
Robertson, former minister
for sport and the Olympics in
London 2012.
A victor could be declared
as early as this month, but the
Gambling Commission’s
ruling could be met with a
legal fight. The fairness of the
contest expected to be at the
centre of any challenge.
Camelot has lined up
leading QC Lord (David)
Pannick, a crossbench peer in
the House of Lords, who
represented the company in
2000 when it successfully
challenged a decision by the
Gambling Commission to
negotiate only with Sir
Richard Branson.
Sabah Meddings about Camelot’s commitment
to good causes, and
questioned whether it
deserved to win the licence
again. “I’m very disappointed
and I’m very concerned that
whoever has awarded this has
not looked at the bigger
picture and the problems
with Camelot’s activities,” she
said.
It was a story in the Daily
Telegraph that said Camelot’s
bid had secured the highest
score. That mark was
reportedly passed to culture
secretary Nadine Dorries. A
final decision will be taken by
the board of the Gambling
Commission, which is
chaired by Marcus Boyle, an
ex-partner at the professional
services firm Deloitte.
Despite the public interest
in the competition, the
commission refuses even to
confirm which bidders have
entered. The terms on which
they will be judged have also
been kept secret.
However, The Sunday
Times can disclose that
bidders are scored on areas
such as how much money
they plan to return to good
causes and charities; what
their transition plan is,
including building the
infrastructure for running the
lottery; and their financial
strength. They are also
marked on factors such as
plans to protect players from
gambling addiction.
The scores are awarded by
the Gambling Commission,
which said it had “carefully
designed the framework to
fairly and
still eke out profits from older wells.
Mitch Flegg, Serica’s chief executive,
said UK gas had lower emissions than
imports, such as the liquefied natural gas
that comes from the likes of Qatar. But he
warned: “A windfall tax may make it
more difficult for companies such as ours
to continue making the level of invest-
ment we’re planning in the next few
years. That may lead to further shortages
and price volatility.”
Looney argued that BP’s profits would
be reinvested in green energy such as off-
shore wind and hydrogen — exactly the
type of investment, and jobs, that the UK
needs. Moreover, energy companies
were racking up huge losses as recently
as 2020, when oil prices briefly turned
negative. BP and Shell recorded com-
bined losses of $42 billion that year. As
another industry executive put it: “You
take the risk, but you do expect a reward.
What you don’t expect, after years of
hardly any money coming in, is to get that
money taken off you.”
The economic theory holds that a
windfall tax should not change the
behaviour of the market because it is a
unique event. Not everyone buys that.
“Nobody would believe it was a one-off,”
said one chief executive. “And the history
of these things is that even when govern-
ments promise to remove it when prices
go down, they are slow to take it away.”
OGUK points to figures that show
exploration for new fields cooled rapidly
after the tax hike in 2011. But Professor
Michael Jacobs, specialist in political
economy at the University of Sheffield,
said: “It cannot be the case that this is
going to hit investments, because these
companies have got much more money
than they were expecting.” The former
adviser to Brown, who described
Labour’s proposed tax increase as
“modest”, said: “You would expect
them to invest more, not less.”
Labour’s proposed tax would only hit
the profits made by oil companies in the
North Sea, rather than their global earn-
ings. Some have questioned how this
would work in practice as some big firms
do not break out UK profits. Moreover,
not all energy companies make money at
the market, or “spot” price, of gas; many
sell forward their product at fixed prices.
Those that have hedged sales in this way
will not be banking as much profit. Nor
would a windfall tax apply to Norweigian
producers, who supply a large propor-
tion of UK gas.
Dibb of the IPPR argued that the physi-
cal location of oil and gas resources low-
ered the likelihood of firms quitting the
North Sea. “It’s not like a tech firm mov-
ing from New York to Dublin,” he said.
“It’s highly unlikely they’ll go elsewhere.”
There is another argument that a
windfall tax may simply miss the point.
While it can act as a sticking plaster to
help households facing the dire choice
between heating and eating, it would
do little long term to address energy
supply, security and prices — let alone
the transition to net zero. “With a wind-
fall tax, you’re not discouraging people
from consuming energy, which is what
the UK should do if it wants to achieve cli-
mate neutrality,” said Alice Pirlot of the
Centre for Business Taxation at Oxford
University. Such a move would most
probably require a “rethink of the entire
UK tax system”, she said. Professor
Jacobs suggested a more creative
approach: “We need to insulate homes
better so people don’t need to use as
much energy. That’s the way to keep bills
down.”
time, millions were struggling through
recession and high unemployment.
Thatcher recalled: “Naturally, the banks
strongly opposed this. But the fact
remained that they had made their large
profits as a result of our policy of high
interest rates, rather than because of
increased efficiency or better service.”
Labour also imposed a windfall tax in
1997 on a string of privatised companies
such as British Airways and British Gas —
sell-offs that were deemed to have been
priced too cheaply and to have left the
businesses too loosely regulated, allow-
ing them to bank huge profits. Labour
raised £5.2 billion from the measure.
Sanger of EY, who worked on the tax for
then-chancellor Gordon Brown, noted
that the measure had been in Labour’s
election manifesto, giving companies
plenty of notice. “By including it in the
manifesto, it was clear that there would
be no other windfall tax,” he said.
In 2009, after the advent of the financial
crisis, Labour levied a one-off 50 per cent
tax on bankers’ bonuses, which brought
in £2 billion — far more than the £550
million that had been expected. It dif-
fered from the previous windfall taxes
in being prospective, rather than retro-
spective. It was supposed to discourage
bank largesse, but instead, it encouraged
companies to hand out even more to make
up for the shortfall in take-home pay.
Banks continued to feel the pain under
the subsequent coalition and Conserva-
tive governments, with the introduction
of the banking levy and bank surcharge,
the latter of which exists to this day —
though neither was strictly a windfall tax
in the sense they were not one-offs.
Likewise, North Sea oil has been a reg-
ular target of tax hits. As early as 1980,
Howe imposed an extra levy on the oil
and gas industry, only to abolish it two
years later. In 2002, Brown introduced a
supplementary charge of 10 per cent on
energy company profits, and doubled it
in 2005 after the likes of BP and Shell
reported bumper profits from higher pri-
ces. The déjà vu does not end there:
Brown committed the funds raised
towards the “Warm Front” scheme — to
help poorer households with energy
bills and home insulation. The indus-
try warned that the measure would
“severely undermine business confi-
dence”, but this did not stop the coali-
tion from raising the charge in 2011.
DEEP FREEZE
Dire warnings that fresh taxes could send
oil and gas investment into a deep freeze
have returned to the fore. The industry
argument goes that gas will be needed for
decades to come as a “transition fuel”
while countries target net-zero emissions
by 2050. In particular, gas will have to
plug a shortfall as coal-fired power sta-
tions close and ageing nuclear plants are
retired. As recent price spikes have
shown, demand for gas could remain
higher than usual for years to come.
“If anything, the UK needs more gas,
not less right now,” Looney said last
week. “That’s going to require more
investment ... A windfall tax prob-
ably isn’t going to incentivise
[that].”
BP and Shell have both been
reducing operations in the North
Sea to focus on easier, and more
profitable, basins. In their place
have come smaller operators, such as
Serica Energy, which reckons it can
NOVEMBER 1980
Magaret Thatcher’s
chancellor, Geoffrey
Howe, raises tax on oil
and gas producers
MARCH 1981
Howe’s budget
introduces a
windfall 2.5 per
cent tax on
bank deposits
JULY 1997
New Labour implements a
manifesto commitment to
bring in a windfall tax on
privatised companies
such as BT, British Gas
and the airports
authority BAA
APRIL 2002
Gordon Brown
introduces
supplementary tax
on oil and gas profits. It
is raised again three years
later
DECEMBER 2009
Alistair Darling, the
chancellor at the time,
imposes
one-off levy of 50 per
cent on any banking
bonus above
£25,000
JANUARY 2011
Coalition
government
introduces banking
levy; the rate is adjusted
over time. The same year,
George Osborne raises
the surcharge on the
North Sea to 32 per
cent, before
reducing it again.
JULY 2015
Conservative
government
announces the bank
surcharge – an extra 8 per
cent on profits in addition to
corporation tax, while
reducing the bank levy
DECEMBER 2019
Labour proposes
windfall levy on oil
and gas companies
in election
manifesto
MARCH 2021
Rishi Sunak raises
corporation tax from
2023 but reduces the bank
surcharge; overall tax for
banks will go up slightly to
28 per cent
JANUARY 2022
Labour and the Liberal
Democrats call for windfall
tax on oil and gas producers
Dina Asher-Smith
is among British
athletes to have
benefited from
lottery income
HISTORY OF
ONE-OFF HITS