second emerges from the consideration of what is to be understood by philosophy both
within the terms set by tradition and, in addition, in the resistance to the dominance and
domination of tradition. Clearly the second of these provides the place to start. In a sense,
however, it opens up much larger problems concerning history, naming, interpretation,
the political, etc., all of which are central to any understanding of Eisenman’s work.
What is at stake in asking the question ‘what is philosophy?’ arises not from the
specificity of a particular response but from the recognition that an answer has already
been determined in advance of the question; this determination in advance is tradition.^5
The tradition within which philosophy is enacted—and hence which it enacts—has
decreed what is going to count as philosophical and therefore what will fall beyond the
borders it constructs. The repetition of philosophy within, by and as tradition reduces it to
the repetition of an ideal essence. It must not be assumed, of course, that that essence
need be at hand. Indeed it is possible to present a conception of philosophy where its
object and its nature are in some sense hidden, and thus what becomes fundamental to, if
not descriptive of, the philosophical task is the revelation of that which is not at hand.
Here repetition is the repetition of that which is essential though concealed.
Countering a conception of philosophy that defines its identity in terms of an ideal
essence means allowing the question ‘what is philosophy?’ to be reposed. The re-posing
of this question unfolds within a repetition that changes the stakes of the question
(recalling the ontology of the object with Cartesianism). The repetition of this question
breaks with the control exercised by the Same. It sanctions a repetition in which the same
is different. The reason for this being the case is explicable in terms of the different
ontologico-temporal dimensions at work within, on the one hand, a repetition that resists
the dominance of the Same, and, on the other, one that repeats it.
The repetition of an ideal essence, whether it be of philosophy or architecture,
necessitates the repetition of that which cannot change. The essence of philosophy or
architecture—an essence which shows itself within their arché and telos—has to endure.
Its endurance must enact and take place within an ontology and temporality of stasis. The
question of the essence therefore comes to be re-posed within that specific ontologico-
temporal concatenation proper to stasis. The unstated premise at work here is that the
name ‘philosophy’—though this will be equally true of the name ‘architecture’—names
that essence. (This premise also operates in those cases where the essence is assumed
even though it is yet to be revealed.) It is clear therefore that re-posing the question of
philosophy or architecture—sanctioning a repetition beyond the Same—involves a
reconsideration of naming as well as of time and existence. If the assumption, that the
nature of philosophy and architecture is not determined by tradition (tradition as the
determination in advance), is accepted then this gives rise to three important and difficult
questions: How are the names philosophy and architecture to be understood? What do
they name? and finally, How do they house tradition?
In a sense all these question are related in so far as they pivot around the problem of
identity and hence of the ontology of identity. On the basis that the identity of
philosophy, and equally of architecture, need not be reduced to the identity handed down
by tradition and which is thus determined in advance, then this will mean that the
repetition of an ideal essence is no longer under consideration as providing the means
whereby the questions of identity and naming can be answered.^6 Furthermore it means
that the borders established by tradition to fend off ‘outside’ claims to be philosophical or
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