architectural, that were, by definition, not sanctioned by tradition, are no longer in place.
Their displacement means that the question of identity is such that it can never be finally
settled. It will remain open. The question ‘what is philosophy?’ will henceforth include
within its range all those answers (answers which will be potentially or actually
conflictual) that claim to be answers to the question. Philosophy, and by extension all
such names, will name the continual attempt to provide an answer to the question of the
identity, both named and demanded, within the question. The resistance to tradition here
becomes the refusal to take over the answer to the question of identity. The taking over of
what is handed down is the repetition of tradition; a repetition articulated within and by
the Same. This will occasion the possibility of a rereading or rather a reworking of texts
(that is objects of interpretation, books, paintings, sculptures, buildings, etc.) that
comprise the history—the past—of the specific name in question. The temporality of this
reworking is extremely complex since it involves a doubling of the object of
interpretation within the act of interpretation. A way of understanding this particular
interplay between time and interpretation is provided by the Freudian conception of
Nachträglichkeit.
Rethinking naming, both the name and what is named, cannot be adequately
undertaken without reference to the ontologico-temporal dimension within which it is
situated. It has already been argued that what marked the repetition of the Same was an
ideal essence articulated within an ontology and temporality of stasis; in other words
within the premises of a philosophy of Being. The conception of naming alluded to above
demands a different understanding of the relationship between time and existence. It
follows from the claim that the question of identity remains an open question, that it is,
by definition, impossible to understand within those categories which demand either an
ideal essence or a unique and singular referent. (This point can, of course, be extended to
include teleology within it.) Furthermore if the answer to the question ‘what is...?’
necessitates an initial acceptance of that plurality of answers that are answers to the
question in so far as they intend to be answers, then their clash will provide precisely
what the name within the ‘what is...?’ question actually names. In sum, therefore,
identity will henceforth be understood as the continual struggle to establish identity. It is
at the very least because of the emphasis on the continuity of struggle (Heraclitean
‘strife’) and the plurality of possible answers (a plurality that is of necessity differential)
that this particular understanding of identity and naming cannot be incorporated into a
philosophy of Being; here, therefore, becoming triumphs over being. It is not surprising
that Eisenman situates his own work within this triumph:
architecture cannot be except as it continuously distances itself from its
own boundaries; it is always in the process of becoming, of changing,
while it is also establishing, institutionalising.^7It must be added that, in addition, the absence and impossibility of an ideal essence needs
to be understood as resisting tradition. It also means that the ways in which tradition can
be resisted are themselves plural and do not have an ideal essence. Were they to be single
in nature then this would construct—if only because it necessitated—an ontological
homology between each answer and the tradition. However there is more at play here
than mere refusal.
Rethinking Architecture 276