The architecture of humanism; a study in the history of taste

2i6 THE

ARCHITECTURE OF HUMANISM

our impression. We donot

argue to the point of

likeness,but,on thecontrary,weare

firstconsci<7Us

ofthe fitness

of the phrase and only subsequer/tly

iperceivetheelementofmetaphor. Bul/artaddr/sses

,

usthroughimmediateimpressionsratherthanth^bugh

theprocessofreflection,andthisuniversalmetamorof

thebody, alanguageprofoundlyfeltanduniversally

understood, is itslargestopportunityN A metaphor

is,

bydefinition, thetranscription ofonethiijg into

termsofanother,andthisinfactiswhatthetheory

underdiscussionclaims. Itclaimstha^architectural

artisthetranscriptionofthebody'sstatesintoforms

ofbuildings

Thenext point is morelikely to causedifficulty.

Theprocessofourtheory

iscomplex

;

theprocessof

our feltenjoyment is the simplest thing we know.

Yet here, too, it should be obvious that

a process

simpleinconsciousnessneed

notbesinipleinanalysis.

It is not suggested that we think of ourselves as

columns, or of columns as ourselves.

No doubt

when keen aesthetic sensibility

is combined with

introspective habit, the processes of transcription

will tend to enter the field of

consciousness. But

there is noreason

whyeven the acutest sensibility

to a resultant pleasure should be conscious

of the

processes thatgo tomake

it. Yetsome causeand

someprocessthere

mustbe. Theprocessesofwhich

we are

least consciousare precisely

themost deep-