The architecture of humanism; a study in the history of taste

2i8 THE

ARCHITECTURE OF

HUMANISM

seriesofartificial

ponceits,butsimply

soperceiving

it.

Toperceiveand

interprettheworld

scientifically,

asit actually

is,issllater, a

less

'

natural,' a

more

sophisticated

process,

and

one from

which we still

relapse even when we

say the sun

is rising. The

scientific

perception oftheworld

isforced uponus

;

thehumanist

perceptionofitis

oursbyright. The

scientific method

is intellectually and

practically

useful,

but the naive, the

anthropomorphic way

which

humanises the world and

interprets it by

analogywith our own

bodies andour own wills,

is

stilltheaesthetic

way;

itisthe

basisofpoetry,and

it

is

thefoundation

ofarchitecture.

A similarconfusion between whatis

conscious

in

architectuml pleasure, and what

is

merely

implied,

seemsto

underliethe

objectionthatourtheorylays

toogreat

a

stressonphysicalstates. Our

pleasure

in

architecture,itistrue, isprimarilyoneof

themind

andthespirit. Yetthelink

betweenphysicalstates

andstatesof the mind and the

emotionsneedsno

emphasis. Our theory does not say that physical

statesenterlargelyintothe

spectator'sconsciousness

;

it says that they, orthe suggestion ofthem,area

necessaryprecondition

of

hispleasure. Theirabsence

fromconsciousnessisindeedapointofrealimportance.

Large

modifications in ourphysicalcondition, when

theyoccur,alterourmentalandemotionaltone

;

but,

also, they absorb our consciousness.

A

person, for