ly, it does not license the dismissal
of the growing evidence for a zoo-
notic origin.
Recently, for example, bat colo-
nies on the border between Laos
and China were discovered to carry
sarbecoviruses that have RBDs al-
most identical to those of SARS-
CoV-2 in both sequence and ability
to enter human cells. This finding
refutes the claim that SARS-CoV-2’s
binding affinity in humans is un-
likely to have a natural origin.
Similarly, although some lab-
leak proponents contend that the
lack of an FCS in the closest rela-
tives of SARS-CoV-2 is indicative
of its manual insertion in a lab, very
recent evidence from SARS-CoV-2
population sequencing suggests
that the insertion of new sequences
from human genes next to the FCS
can be detected. Moreover, the clos-
est relative of the SARS-CoV-2 spike
in the Laotian bat viruses would re-
quire the addition of only a single
amino acid to generate a putative
FCS. Thus, in a species where it
would have a major selective ad-
vantage, it would probably be very
easy for some of these bat coronavi-
ruses to rapidly evolve an FCS.
This research sketches a clear
zoonotic path to the emergence
of the RBD and FCS. Although
some evolutionary gaps along this
path persist, their number and
size have been dwindling. A de-
tailed analysis in late 2021 further
strengthened the link to the Huan-
an markets as the point of origin
of the virus and the initial source
of community transmission. This
rapidly growing body of evidence
for a zoonotic origin of SARS-CoV-2
creates increasing difficulties for
the lab-engineering hypothesis.CONSPIRATORIAL
COGNITION
in normal scientific inquiry, as evi-
dence emerges, the remaining space
for plausible hypotheses narrows.
Some facets continue to be support-
ed, and others are contradicted and
eventually precluded altogether.
Some of the strongest advocates
for a lab origin for SARS-CoV-2
changed their views as they learnedmore. Baltimore, for instance, with-
drew his “smoking gun” comment
when challenged by additional evi-
dence, conceding that a natural ori-
gin was also possible. Revising or
rejecting failed hypotheses in light
of refuting evidence is central to
the scientific process. Not so with
conspiracy theories and pseudosci-
ence. One of their hallmarks is that
they are self-sealing: as more evi-
dence against the conspiracy
emerges, adherents keep the theory
alive by dismissing contrary evi-
dence as further proof of the con-
spiracy, creating an ever more elab-
orate and complicated theory.
There is perhaps no better exam-
ple of self-sealing cognition than
the contortions of climate change
denial that erupted after the 2009
“Climategate” controversy. At that
time thousands of documents and
e-mails were stolen from the Cli-
matic Research Unit of the Univer-
sity of East Anglia in England and
made public right before the United
Nations climate conference in Co-
penhagen. The e-mails were cherry-
picked by deniers for sound bites
that, when taken out of context,
seemed to point to malfeasance by
scientists. Ultimately nine indepen-
dent inquiries around the world
cleared the scientists of misconduct,
and nine of the warmest years ever
measured have occurred in the
11 years since Climategate.
Undeterred by the exonerations,
climate deniers—including at least
one U.S. congressperson—branded
the inquiries as a “whitewash.” The
volume of activity on skeptics’ Web
sites relating to the hacked e-mails
continued to increase for at least
four years, long after the public had
lost all interest in the confected
scandal. It was only in late 2021
that one of the principals making
unfounded accusations against the
scientists apologized for his role.
The e-mails were publicly mis-
represented as a result of an un-
solved hack, but top scientists and
health officials also have seen their
correspondence become public
through Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA) requests by groups with
long histories of attacking scien-Pandemic-Era Research
Paid Off—and Will
for Years
AFTER COVID APPEARED, a huge number of virolo-
gists, biochemists, cell biologists and immunologists
shifted their work to the coronavirus, and because
of that, the world got what it was desperately hop-
ing for: a vaccine, in record time. Everything worked
out better than we could have dreamed—several
parallel vaccines, all with high efficacy. We are see-
ing antiviral treatments roll out, too.
Scientists can leverage all this effort to better
understand other viruses and diseases. Never before
have we been able to simultaneously test multiple
vaccine platforms, head-to-head, in massive global
clinical trials. Usually you are lucky if you get one
vaccine to trial, and if it fails, you will not really know
whether the concept or just the one platform failed.
I anticipate that scientists will use all the COVID
research infrastructure to build more vaccines
against other pathogens, such as cytomegalovirus
and respiratory syncytial virus, and to create mRNA
vaccines for flu. Furthermore, most of the coronavi-
rus research has been collaborative. That will stick
with people. It will make future work pay off more
than if all those individuals went back to just their
own niches.
This is not going to be the last spillover pandemic
we see. It is not going to be the last public health cri-
sis. I hope that COVID has given the public a sense
of how important it is to have sustained investment
in science. We don’t know what discovery we will
stumble on that will be the lifesaver the next time.Britt Glaunsinger is a molecular virologist at the University of
California, Berkeley, and the Howard Hughes Medical Institute.Illustration by James Olstein© 2022 Scientific American