The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are So Rich and Some So Poor (W W Norton & Company; 1998)

(Nora) #1
EMPIRE IN THE EAST^127

hands, nor trade with the natives except in the same manner, standing
always upon our guard."^2
Did ever newcomers try harder to make trouble for themselves?
Even so, Portuguese political strategy necessarily diverged sharply
from the opportunistic Spanish conquests. For one thing, the locals
were far more numerous, and their familiarity with metal and war made
them serious adversaries. For another, they were not vulnerable to
Portuguese-imported diseases. On the contrary, the Portuguese had
cause to fear local contagion and parasites. As a result, they had to
limit their craving so as not to dissipate their forces. The Portuguese
looked for choice places of strategic import, key points controlling key
passages—Malindi and Mombasa on the African coast (jump-off points
for voyages to India), Ormuz at the mouth of the Persian Gulf,
Malacca (between Sumatra and Malaysia, on the strait connecting the
Indian Ocean and Gulf of Ceylon to the South China Sea and the
Spice Islands), Macao near the mouth of the Pearl River (entry to
southeast China). They wanted Aden (access to the Red Sea), but
could never take it. The most important base of all was Goa, pearl of
the Malabar coast—entrepôt for pepper, port of entry for Arabian
horses into South India (the climate made it impracticable to breed
horses locally), defended by sea and, on the landward side, by a chan­
nel stocked with crocodiles.
In the end, the native rulers of these regions learned to live and do
business with these Portuguese enclaves, as they had with other out­
siders since time immemorial. When they did attack Europeans, they
were thwarted as often as not by their own local enemies. The Por­
tuguese played the balance of power to a fare-thee-well, and it saved
them more than once.
But more serious adversaries were on their way. Everything changed
once the Dutch and English entered the arena. In 1605, the Dutch
took Amboina and drove the Portuguese from other bases in the
Moluccas (Spice Islands). In 1622, the Portuguese lost Ormuz to the
Persians, who were decisively assisted by English ships and gunners. In
1638, the Dutch took Elmina, that first Portuguese fort on the Guinea
coast, symbol of their pioneer voyages and market for African gold
and slaves. In 1641, it was Malacca's turn, again to the Dutch; in
1665-67, Macassar's. In the course of all this, the Dutch simply threw
the Portuguese out of the Spice Islands, the original point of the ex­
ercise. Portugal's day had come and gone, but pride thrives on re­
verses, and they clung to what they could. Thus they held Goa until
1961 (long after it had lost wealth and commercial importance), when

Free download pdf