GOLCONDA^153to the English for gifts (bribes) and stipends, shipped export goods in
their vessels, and in some instances even invested with them. Thomas
Roe, ambassador to the Court of the Great Moghul in Agra, defined
the task: "Let this be received as a rule, that if you will profit, seek it
at sea and in quiet trading, for without controversy it is an error to seek
garrisons and land wars in India."^3
The Dutch also tried to play this game in India, but fell short of Eng
lish success. For the Dutch, Indonesia had priority, and India got the
leavings of their attention and resources. In the islands, Dutch fire
power extruded competitors, made violence easier. They got off on
their strong foot, and the aggressive temperament of such proconsuls
as Coen set the pattern. Dutch preferences also reflected material op
portunities. They aimed at monopoly in Indonesia, against the inter
est of the locals. That was not feasible in India, where home rulers were
stronger and where other players, already established, disputed the
marketplace.
Yet all businessmen prefer monopoly to competition. Once English
strength increased, they too resorted to force: threats of naval block
ade that would have hurt Indian trade to other countries and inter
rupted the pilgrimage to Mecca; construction and garrisoning of forts;
seizure and ransom of Indian vessels. In 1677, Gerald Aungier, the East
India Company's president at Surat and governor at Bombay, wrote
the directors in London to spell out the new conditions of business. He
recommended a "severe and vigorous" policy: "Justice and necessity of
your estate now require you to manage your general commerce with
your sword in your hands." This advice found favor in London, where
Josiah Child headed the company and was determined to surmount the
vagaries of Indian politics. In 1687, instructions went out to Fort St.
George (outside Madras): use power to ensure a large and continuing
revenue, such as might lay "the foundation of a large, well-grounded,
sure English dominion in India for all time to come."^4 Here was a
ticket to involvement in Indian politics and government. Already the
breakup of the Moghul empire loomed, leading Indian pretenders to
power to seek allies among the foreign companies.
Meanwhile the nature of hereditary rule is to produce fools as well
as statesmen, and the Moghuls mistakenly nourished the conviction
that merchants like the British could only submit to the warrior chil
dren of Timur and Babar. The Nawab of Bengal squeezed and mulcted
them in time-honored fashion—after all, what are sponges good for?
For a time, the British stood still and complied. But these were not