(^488) THE WEALTH AND POVERTY OF NATIONS
the bosses have their aims; the workers, theirs; the shareholders,
theirs. And while all are theoretically united by loyalty to the
enterprise, the meaning of that loyalty is subject to competing
interests. Hence a constant, latent tension, punctuated by conflicts
and showdowns.
Japan does not work that way. Japanese company unions almost
always obtain their wage demands because they have been negotiated
with management in advance. Such strikes as occur are often
symbolic, one-day affairs, just to show that the workers are serious.
Contrast the United States: there the talks are often pro forma, and
issues are resolved by test of force. Sometimes, by miscalculation, the
battle ends in closure of company or plant—who needs all this
trouble? Too often the combat leaves a residue of hard feeling that
embitters relations and invites another round. Both sides proclaim
victory, but just wait until next time.^28
Is this Japanese mode of "lean production," quality control, and
labor-management partnership exportable? Can Americans learn new
ways? We have the beginning of an answer in the performance—in
the United States but also in Britain—of Japanese affiliâtes: Honda,
Toyota, Mitsubishi, et al. These plants owe their origin to trade
barriers; they were built to get behind the walls. They pay about the
same wages as American firms, but they have been able to keep out
the unions with their task segmentation and divided sovereignty.
They also have relied extensively on imported components, to the
point of raising questions about the nationality of the product. But
that is the nature of global industry: one buys cheapest. In the
meantime, these transplants seem to show higher labor productivity
and quality than ail-American firms, though Japanese factories in
Japan do somewhat better.^29
These results tell us what American workers can do starting from
scratch. These non-unionized transplants are free of suspicions and
- The same in Japanese criminal trials: by the time the matter comes to court, the ac
cused has largely conceded, so that the conviction rate is almost 100 percent,
î The nature of Japanese labor relations has been a puzzie to specialists. Is this absence
of conflict a stage that labor will outgrow? Or does it reflect deep-rooted social values
and traditions? Many Japanese incline to the latter explanation, but Galenson and
Odaka, "The Japanese Labor Market," p. 627, do not think it necessary "to fall back
on well-worn generalizations about family structure and the hierarchical, traditional
ist nature of Japanese society." Is an explanation less persuasive or valid because it is
"well-worn"?