The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are So Rich and Some So Poor (W W Norton & Company; 1998)

(Nora) #1

(^498) THE WEALTH AND POVERTY OF NATIONS
have said no? ) Withal, the task was apparendy botched: the core was
not completely smothered; "the situation" not stabilized.
The area around the plant has become a place of fear. Is the fear jus­
tified? The definitive answer may not come for decades: low levels of
radiation work slowly. Some scientists speak of fifty years. By then all
the victims will be dead. The residents of the area have chosen caution
and terror. Most have left and not returned; but some never left and
some have come back to take advantage of empty land. One such die­
hard, a woman of sixty-five, reassures herself that she is still feeling
fine. She has rules of thumb: plant apple seeds deep in the ground; eat
no more than ten kilos of mushrooms; "if you feel too much radiation,
you have to drink some vodka." Her neighbor believes what she sees:
"Look at this place. Where do you see any radiation? If anything, this
place is better now that there are less people." And some try to laugh
about their plight. They tell the joke about the farmer who is selling ap­
ples under a big sign, APPLES FROM CHERNOBYL. "YOU must be mad,"
says a passerby. "No one wants to buy apples from Chernobyl." "Sure
they do," says the vendor. "Some people buy them for their mother-
in-law, others for their wife."^6 (And maybe others for their husband.)
As a result, although other accidents and natural catastrophes may
have cost more lives—the chemical leak at Bhopal, India, in 1984,
perhaps—none has been more damaging to reputation and prestige.

Repugnance and repudiation were in direct proportion to the techno­
logical arrogance and gigantism that inspired and sanctified Soviet
programs and projects.^7 The socialist command economy was tarred
with incompetence, credulity, stupidity, and indifference to the public
weal—among other sins—the more so because of clumsy attempts at
concealment and mitigation. "It is now clear that the political reper­
cussions from Chornobyl accelerated the collapse of the Soviet em­
pire."^8
A dozen nuclear plants on the Chernobyl model are still in opera­
tion.



  • This was not what the Soviet authorities told the public; or, for that matter, what
    the International Atomic Energy Agency was ready to admit. Cf. Alexander R. Rich,
    "10 Years Later, Chernobyl's True Story Is Hard to Nail Down," Boston Globe, 26
    April 1996, p. 21.
    t The human cost of Chernobyl may never be known. Officials, including medical
    personnel, were under great pressure to minimize casualties. (Contrast Bhopal, where
    the injured had a financial incentive to make claims.) Feshback and Friendly, Ecocide
    in the USSR, p. 152, think doctors cleared out because they feared public anger. They
    may have feared radiation more.

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