(^536) NOTES
- J. P. Coen to the Heeren XVII (the board of directors of the VOC), 27 Decem
ber 1614, cited by Boxer, Dutch Seaborne Empire, p. 107. On the career of Coen, see
Masselman, Cradle of Colonialism. - J. P. Coen to the Heeren XVII, in Boxer, Dutch Seaborne Empire, p. 107.
- Cf. C. P. Thunberg, Travels in Europe, Africa and Asia, 1770-1779,1, 277, cited
in Boxer, Dutch Seaborne Empire, pp. 238-39. - Hannay, The Great Chartered Companies, cited in Boxer, Dutch Seaborne Empire,
pp. 225-26. - Furnivall, Netherlands Indies, p. 49.
- Early on, in the 1620s, the VOC apparentiy accepted to share with the English its
monopoly in the Spice Islands, on condition that the English share the cost of gar
risoning the area. The English found it cheaper to withdraw—Prakash, "Dutch East
India Company," p. 188. - Furnivall, Netherlands India, p. 39.
- In regard to English (British) trade with the North American colonies, Adam
Smith reasons that monopoly due to the navigation acts raised the rate of profit above
what it would have been in a free market—Wealth of Nations, Book IV, ch. 7, Part 3.
But he does not factor in the effect on revenue in the colonies and hence on tax rev
enues to the mother country. Had he done so, he would have found one more reason
to disapprove of such interference with the market. - Furnivall, Netherlands India, p. 39; Vlekke, Nusantara, pp. 203-04.
- Wealth of Nations, Book III, ch. 7, Part 3.
- Braudel, Civilisation matérielle, III: Le temps du monde, p. 191.
- Braudel notes (ibid.) that Johannes Hudde, chairman of the board at the end of
the seventeenth century, was well aware of the difficulty and tried to revise (transform)
the system of accounts. He never succeeded. "For a thousand reasons and real diffi
culties. But perhaps also because the directors of the Company were not keen on pub
lishing clear accounts." Opacity has its advantages. This too is not unknown in modern
business management, the more so when there are conflicts of interest among own
ers, directors, and managers.
CHAPTER 11- Sainsbury, ed., Calendar of State Papers, East Indies, para. 321, cited in Masselman,
Cradle of Colonialism, p. 281. - The English, building on an imperial firman exempting them from custom duties,
took all manner of merchants under their protection and sold them passes, while levy
ing upon agents and representatives of the Nawab and taxing land transfers and mar
riages in the area under their control. The result: a constant outcry at the court of
Bengal that made war inevitable—Edwardes, Battle ofPlassey, pp. 23-24, citing Cap
tain Rennie, in 1756. - Cited in Bhattacharya, East India Company, p. 19 f.
- Both ibid., p. 22.
- Edwardes, Battle ofPlassey, p. 24.
- Chaudhuri, Trading World of Asia, p. 195.
- On all this, see Steensgaard, "Trade of England," pp. 123-26. His Table 3.8
shows summary estimates of imports of Indian (plus some Chinese) textiles into Eu
rope, 1651-1760, by VOC and EIC. These data show that the EIC was in a stronger
position than its rivals even before the Battle of Plassey. Steensgaard attributes this
among other things to the greater decentralization of the English company and the ini
tiative allowed its agents in the field. - Journal of the House of Commons, 14 February 1704, XTV, 336, cited in Chaud
huri, Trading World of Asia, p. 277.